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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW AS
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTORATION
JOHN O. MCGINNIS†
INTRODUCTION
This Essay mounts a fresh normative defense of the president’s
exercise of regulatory review authority and his role in enforcing fed-
eralism—responsibilities embodied in executive orders issued by
President Ronald Reagan and continued in large measure by Presi-
dent William Jefferson Clinton.1 These executive orders move in
some measure toward the restoration of two central principles of the
original Constitution—tricameralism2 (i.e., the combination of bicam-
eralism and the presidential veto) and federalism. The soundness of
these orders as a bipartisan, post–New Deal structure of governance
derives from their ability to advance the implicit goal of these vener-
able constitutional principles—producing government regulation that
efficiently promotes the public interest rather than special interests.
Copyright © 2001 by John O. McGinnis.
† Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School. This Essay is based on a paper
presented at the Duke Law Journal’s Administrative Law Conference held at Duke University
School of Law on March 5, 2001. The Duke University School of Law’s Program in Public Law
provided additional financial support for the 2001 conference. The theory of tricameralism as an
implicit supermajority rule offered here was conceived in John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rap-
paport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript
on file with the Duke Law Journal). Professor Rappaport thus shares the credit (such as it is) for
those ideas, and I am grateful for his collaboration. Thanks to participants at the annual admin-
istrative law conference at Duke Law School, at the New York City Bar Association’s Adminis-
trative Law section, and at the American Bar Association’s Annual Symposium on Administra-
tive Law, where earlier drafts of this paper were presented. I am grateful to Neal Devins, John
Duffy, Nelson Lund, Michael Herz, John Manning, Mark Movsesian, Paul Verkuil, and Jona-
than Weiner for their helpful comments.
1. President Reagan’s executive order on regulatory review, Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 127 (1981), was revoked by President Clinton’s regulatory review order, Exec. Order No.
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). President Reagan’s executive or-
der on federalism, Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987), was revoked by President
Clinton’s federalism order, Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2000).
2. See infra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
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These constitutional foundations were in need of repair because the
modern administrative state had eroded their effectiveness. This Es-
say defends presidential review as a step to constitutional restoration
and suggests some revisions to these executive orders that will in-
crease their effectiveness in achieving this revival.
Federalism and tricameralism were the cornerstones of the origi-
nal Constitution. By limiting the federal government to the domestic
powers necessary to sustain a free trade zone, the federalism of the
original Constitution made states responsible for activities that were
best regulated locally, thus encoding a principle of subsidiarity into
our polity. Moreover, by forcing states to compete with one another
in providing appropriate government regulation, constitutional feder-
alism restrained interest groups and rulers from using state govern-
ment to serve their interests rather than the public good. Tricameral-
ism—the requirement that federal legislation be passed by two houses
of the legislature and be either approved by the president or passed
by a two-thirds vote of both houses over a presidential veto—also
helped assure that the federal government acts for the public good.
Tricameralism functioned much like a supermajority rule, which
screens public interest legislation from special interest legislation. It
also promoted deliberation and consensus, two features that lead to
better government regulation overall.
Unfortunately, both of these cornerstones of the Constitution
have been gravely weakened in the last century. First, under the
modern interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress retains es-
sentially plenary power over economic regulation and has used this
power to impose regulations on matters that could best be addressed
locally. In spite of the recent judicial revival of federalism, the Su-
preme Court has not restricted the federal government’s power in the
economic arena.3 Second, tricameralism has declined with the rise of
the modern administrative state because, pursuant to congressional
delegation, administrative agencies may impose regulations without
overcoming the hurdle of legislative passage in two houses and presi-
dential approval. Special interest groups can have substantial influ-
ence over administrative regulations, and the regulations may reflect
3. For instance, in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), Chief Justice Rehnquist
was careful to cite Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the case that symbolizes Congress’s
plenary authority over economic matters, favorably. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. But see United
States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 1999) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (contending
that noneconomic activity should not be aggregated even if the activity has economic effects),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1203 (2000).
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less broad-based deliberation and consensus than laws and regula-
tions that are passed under the tricameral procedures.
The federalism executive order4 and the regulatory review execu-
tive order5 revive the key constitutional principles of federalism and
tricameralism and strengthen their objectives for the modern era.
Through the federalism order, the president, within the discretion
provided by regulatory statutes, can use his authority to revive sensi-
ble limitations on the national government by reserving to the states
the authority to address regulatory problems within their jurisdictions
and the authority to provide distinctive public goods appropriate to
their citizens’ preferences. In doing so, the president also can revital-
ize jurisdictional competition among the states to facilitate efficient
regulation and restrain special interest groups. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the order may help revive the decentralized struc-
ture that the Framers believed essential to quicken the spirit of self-
government within citizens of a continental republic.
It may seem paradoxical that the only official elected by the en-
tire nation can be responsible for enforcing economic federalism. Al-
though this idea may seem superficially surprising, it has deep roots in
political economy. The regulatory competition afforded by federalism
helps create economic growth, and the president’s fortunes (and those
of the successor candidate of his party) are more dependent on eco-
nomic growth than are those of any other federal official.6 In contrast,
the regional nature of congressional representation creates a variation
of the tragedy of the commons in which congressional representatives
seek government action that is advantageous for their state even at
the expense of the nation.
For similar reasons, the president has incentives to revive the re-
straints on lawmaking that the original Constitution imposed through
bicameralism and the presidential veto (tricameralism) and that have
been eroded by the modern administrative state.7 Regulatory review
4. Throughout this Essay, the “federalism executive order” and the “federalism order”
refer to President Clinton’s federalism order, Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999), re-
printed in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000), which replaced President Reagan’s federalism order, Exec. Or-
der No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987).
5. Likewise, throughout this Essay the “regulatory review executive order” and the
“regulatory review order” refer to President Clinton’s regulatory review order, Exec. Order No.
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000), which replaced President
Reagan’s regulatory review order, Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981).
6. See infra notes 75, 127 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
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by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), under
presidential direction, compensates in some measure for the decline
of tricameralism in the last sixty years. The addition of a layer of re-
view by OIRA compensates for the loss of bicameralism that has oc-
curred through broad delegations of power to administrative agen-
cies. Like bicameralism, the OIRA review process puts an additional
screen between government decrees and the citizen by filtering out
special interest regulations from those in the public interest. By al-
lowing the president to monitor regulation by the executive branch,
the regulatory review order also compensates for the loss of the veto
power over government regulation that has resulted from broad dele-
gation. Finally, the substance of the cost-benefit analysis mandated by
the regulatory review order8 helps screen public interest regulations
from those sought by special interests—an implicit objective of the
original Constitution’s requirements for legislative enactments.9
Given this view of the federalism order and the regulatory review
order as means toward constitutional restoration, this Essay presents
suggestions for strengthening both these orders. For instance, the
federalism order should be revised to make more explicit the virtues
of regulatory competition and to direct that, within the discretion
provided by law,10 the federal government should regulate only when
state regulation would be inadequate to address the problem. This
perspective necessarily requires the federalism order to be linked to
the cost-benefit analysis contemplated by the regulatory review order.
This linkage should have institutional advantages as well, because it
would provide a more effective enforcement mechanism for the fed-
eralism order. Federal agencies would take their federalism responsi-
8. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128; Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(6), 3
C.F.R. 638, 638.
9. Michael Rappaport and I discuss these implicit structural objectives at greater length in
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript on file with the Duke Law Journal).
10. The president can direct the agency only in the exercise of discretion the law provides
it. Thus, Congress could prohibit an agency from taking the benefits of jurisdictional competi-
tion into account in framing its regulations. Cf. James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Bene-
fits and Costs of Regulatory Reforms for Superfund, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 159, 160 (1997) (dis-
cussing the possibility that superfund legislation could forbid cost-benefit analysis and thus
make it impossible for the regulatory review process established by the executive order to de-
ploy cost-benefit analysis).
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bilities more seriously if OIRA were directed to reject regulations
that fail to comply with the standards of the federalism order.11
Turning to the regulatory review order, this Essay suggests that
just as bicameralism and the presidential veto apply to all bills, the
regulatory review order should apply to all regulations to screen more
comprehensively special interest regulations from public interest
regulations. Moreover, because at the margin independent agencies
are even more likely to be dominated by special interests than are
agencies whose heads are not insulated from presidential removal, the
regulatory review order should be extended to independent agencies.
Furthermore, although President Clinton substantially restricted the
delays that OIRA could impose in the course of its review, the regula-
tory review order should not impose such restrictions unless the
regulatory law at issue can be fairly read to require the implementa-
tion of a regulation by a specific date. One of the advantages of bi-
cameralism and the presidential veto lies in delaying legislation until a
substantial consensus is reached.
On the substance of cost-benefit analysis, this Essay recommends
that the order be revised to take account of the dynamic costs of
regulations. Public choice theory has shown that businesses will use
regulatory regimes to raise their competitors’ costs and that other in-
terest groups will exploit these regimes to obtain benefits at the pub-
lic’s expense.12 Just as the effects of tax revisions should take account
of the resulting changes in taxpayer’s behavior, so should the costs of
regulations take account of changes in interest groups’ behavior. If
regulations make rent seeking more attractive, as they frequently do,
such increased rent seeking decreases the productivity of society and
must be reflected in any cost-benefit analysis.
11. The understanding of competitive federalism as the lodestar of the federalism order
also provides for a new perspective on the regulatory review order’s approach to preemption.
See infra notes 191–222 and accompanying text. The past federalism executive orders have re-
quired agencies to find a clear statement before they adopt an interpretation that requires or
permits them to promulgate a regulation that conflicts with state law. See infra note 191 and ac-
companying text. This rationale for a clear statement requirement in the preemption arena,
however, is based on a jurisprudential view that conflicts with that of the Supreme Court and
has been challenged by recent scholarship assessing the original understanding of the Constitu-
tion. Regardless of the resolution of this jurisprudential debate, however, the president’s inter-
est in promoting competitive federalism provides a policy rationale for a more nuanced but still
potent clear statement rule applicable to all regulatory initiatives that would interfere with
regulatory competition by displacing the state regulatory role. In contrast, when a federal regu-
lation comports with competitive federalism, as when it addresses spillovers among state juris-
dictions, the clear statement rule need not apply.
12. See infra notes 243–44 and accompanying text.
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Of course, even with these changes, the executive orders will not
fully restore the cornerstones of federalism and tricameralism. The
tension between one regulatory body—OIRA—and substantive
regulatory bodies like the Environmental Protection Agency may not
provide a deliberative process that is as demanding as the legislative
process. Thus, other structures may well be necessary to restore a de-
liberative process that leads to optimal regulation for the public good.
But the federalism and regulatory review executive orders are steps in
the right direction.
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL DECLINE AND THE RISE OF
CENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION
Individuals need government to create public goods that the
market and the family cannot or will not supply. Examples of such
public goods include military defense and the rule of law that makes
property secure. They also include regulations that address external-
ities such as pollution. But the same motivations that drive people to
create items for exchange in the market will lead them to try to use
the government to take resources for themselves.13 Thus, the central
dilemma of politics is that when a government is sufficiently powerful
to supply public goods, it is also powerful enough to expropriate its
citizens’ property.14 Based on this understanding, constitutionalism
necessarily concentrates on discovering mechanisms that will make
government provide a high ratio of public interest goods to expropria-
tion or private interest goods.
One way of understanding the Framers’ Constitution is that it of-
fered a particularly sophisticated structure that achieves these ends
through the decentralization provided by federalism and the substan-
tial barriers to federal rent-seeking legislation created by bicameral-
ism and presentment. In this Part, the constitutional decline of these
structures is briefly traced and the stage is set for understanding the
regulatory review and federalism executive orders as movements to-
ward constitutional restoration.
13. This activity is frequently called “rent seeking” in the public choice literature, particu-
larly when the redistribution is in the form of monopoly profits from regulation and tariffs.
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 229, 235 (1989).
14. Barry Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Feder-
alism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 24–28 (1995).
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A. The Decline of Constitutional Federalism
One advantage of federalism is that a properly designed dual sys-
tem of government with independent federal and state authority can
limit the total amount of rent seeking by interest groups more effec-
tively than a unitary state can. Rent seeking from the national gov-
ernment is limited by giving it only limited powers, which include
limited powers of taxation. Rent seeking from state government is
limited by putting state governments in competition with one another
for capital, including human capital.15 The bridge between the two
mechanisms is that the limited powers of the national government
sustain the conditions for competition among the state governments.
Recent models of competitive federalism confirm that, as a mat-
ter of efficiency, the federal government should regulate only those
activities that have spillover effects among the states.16 Where there
are no substantial spillover effects (for instance, in the case of envi-
ronmental regulation when jurisdictions do not pollute beyond their
bounds), states are likely to provide appropriate levels of regulation
even though they are competing to attract businesses from other ju-
risdictions. The simplified argument is that such competition allows
the cost of regulations to be reflected directly in lost wages—employ-
ees value public goods such as the environment or safety regulation
and will accept lower wages to possess them.17 This connection be-
tween regulation and wages creates a dynamic that leads to the opti-
mal level of regulation because the level of regulation is set at a point
at which the marginal cost of a unit of regulation equals the marginal
15. See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
147, 150 (Winter 1992) (stating that federalism introduces intergovernmental competition be-
cause of the continuing exit threat that individuals will move to another state).
16. For an excellent discussion of this thesis, see generally Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitat-
ing Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environ-
mental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (challenging the argument that competitive
federalism serves as the basis for federal environmental regulations). See also Henry N. Butler
& Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Envi-
ronmental Regulatory Authority, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 23, 25 (1996) (arguing that environmental
regulatory authority should be allocated to areas affected by pollution rather than to areas that
can harmonize standards). For a more complete discussion of the problem of spillovers in a fed-
eral regime, see John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114
HARV. L. REV. 511, 561–63 (2000).
17. For a full discussion of this argument, see Walter Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Eco-
nomic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J.
PUB. ECON. 333, 336 (1988). Oates and Schwab assume that individuals cannot move among
jurisdictions. Id.
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benefit for individuals within that jurisdiction.18 As long as the costs
and benefits are substantially confined to the state, the state govern-
ment—rather than the federal government—should provide public
goods, including appropriate regulatory regimes. This process re-
strains rent seeking and provides optimal public goods.
Another way of understanding the advantages of jurisdictional
competition is that centralized regulation, even when that regulation
is the product of a democratic process, has difficulty measuring citi-
zens’ preferences because elections are a relatively crude method of
assessment.19 In contrast, jurisdictional competition is a discovery
mechanism for preferences because it helps employees decide how to
value regulations in terms of their preferences. Regulations are avail-
able for other states to emulate or reject, which creates, as Justice
Brandeis noted, a “laboratory” of democracy in which the successful
experiments of yesterday may become the effective public policy of
tomorrow.20
Besides the advantages of providing a superior discovery process
for regulations, state regulatory authority has two other advantages.
First, different states provide different political niches for a diverse
people, responding to different preferences with different goods.21 In-
habitants of San Francisco may simply have different preferences and
needs from those of Dubuque, and uniform rules that fail to take ac-
count of this diversity could leave inhabitants alienated from their
government.
Second, federalism increases civic responsibility. Political scien-
tists frequently have noted that in large governments citizens behave
strategically, consequently making it harder to reach agreement on
18. Revesz, supra note 16, at 1238. This model of jurisdictional competition provides the
answer to those who argue that federal regulation is needed to avoid the “race to the bottom,”
the claim that competition among the states will cause them to choose suboptimal regulations in
order to attract business. Of course, even if there were a race-to-the-bottom problem, federal
regulations might not be the best way to address it. Because of the public choice problems pre-
viously noted, a centralized institution may be captured by interest groups and consequently
choose a bad standard.
19. For a discussion of the reasons that the national political process fails to obtain accu-
rate information about individuals’ preferences, see infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
20. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citi-
zens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.”).
21. For a discussion of the way associations can perform this function, see MUELLER, supra
note 13, at 149–73.
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the public goods that will improve the community.22 Federalism and
the more encompassing principle of subsidiarity (by which states de-
volve powers to localities) temper strategic behavior and substitute in
its place the genuine concern of one citizen for another.23 As Alexis
De Tocqueville said:
It is incontestably true that the love and habits of republican gov-
ernment in the United States were engendered in the townships and
in the provincial assemblies. . . . [I]t is this same republican spirit, it
is these manners and customs of a free people, which are engen-
dered and nurtured in the different States, to be afterwards applied
to the country at large.24
One of federalism’s greatest public goods is that it provides a frame-
work for sustaining the virtues necessary for self-government.
There is also historical evidence that the structure of federalism
had substantial success in restraining rent seeking and thus in facili-
tating economic growth. Indeed, some economists suggest that decen-
tralization was responsible for much of the economic progress of the
United States as it was transformed from a fledgling republic to an
economic superpower during the nineteenth century.25
The decline of federalism has been discussed elsewhere and it is
unnecessary to belabor the issue here.26 It will suffice to say that there
were two important stages of federalism’s decline. The first came in
the Progressive Era, when the Seventeenth Amendment’s mandate
for direct election of senators weakened federalism’s restraints on
production of private interest goods in two ways. First, because sena-
tors became independent of state legislators, they no longer had an
incentive to protect state sovereignty.27 To the contrary, after the
22. See id. at 14 (discussing the distinctions between the formal voting procedures in a de-
mocracy and the informal decisionmaking processes of the family).
23. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1510 (1987) (examining the Founders’ belief that “public virtue” could not be culti-
vated in a centralized government).
24. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 181 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Schocken Books 1961) (1835).
25. See Weingast, supra note 14, at 8–9 (noting that federalism facilitated the development
of America’s large common market).
26. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Consti-
tutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 390–91 (1999) (discussing the decline of feder-
alism); John O. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Its Decline: A Public Choice Perspec-
tive, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 204 (1997) (same).
27. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 26, at 391; see Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast:
Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’ Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
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Amendment, senators had a natural inclination to encroach on state
sovereignty because states were a competing power center for servic-
ing constituents and interest groups. As a result, federalism—which
depended on Congress’s adherence to the Constitution’s enumerated
powers—lost a crucial institutional defense within the federal gov-
ernment.28 One way of understanding the president’s renewed role in
the protection of federalism is that, after the Seventeenth Amend-
ment, the president has a greater interest in sustaining state auton-
omy than do members of the Senate.29
Second, national regulatory regimes of broader scope than ever
before were enacted in the New Deal, thus gravely weakening regula-
tory competition among the states. While the Court struck down
some of these initial schemes as beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause
power,30 public pressure and a series of appointments by President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt ultimately ended resistance to the exer-
cise of national authority. By the early 1940s, the Supreme Court had
abandoned the constitutional limitations that prevented the federal
government from directly regulating manufacturing and the condi-
tions of labor, thereby greatly increasing special interest power to ob-
tain regulatory rents.31 Congress now has gained plenary regulatory
power in economic matters,32 essentially ending the wealth-creating
jurisdictional competition among the states.
B. The Decline of Tricameralism
Tricameralism consists of the requirement that a bill receive the
approval of the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the presi-
500, 557 (1997) (noting that the Seventeenth Amendment greatly increased the independence of
senators from state legislatures).
28. See Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, the Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of
the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 189, 206–07 (1987)
(discussing the Seventeenth Amendment’s crippling effect on senators’ interest in protecting the
states).
29. I discuss this point further infra notes 127–32 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310 (1936) (holding that the wage
provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 exceeded Congress’s power under
the Commerce Clause).
31. For a description of this process, see Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the
Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1443–54 (1987).
32. See Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Ap-
plying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control
over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 85 (1999) (discussing the plenary power that the New
Deal Court established for Congress in economic matters).
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dent or, in the event that the president vetoes the bill, obtain two-
thirds support in the House of Representatives and the Senate.33 Tri-
cameralism, like federalism, is another structure that helps the gov-
ernment resist rent seeking. Moreover, tricameralism generally con-
tributes to the freedom from regulation that gives primacy to a social
order created by voluntary interactions among citizens (such as com-
mercial markets).34 The Framers, of course, did not expressly claim
that the goal of bicameralism and presentment was to restrain fac-
tions and thereby promote the public good. Nevertheless, some of the
Framers, like Alexander Hamilton and Joseph Story, did have an in-
choate understanding of matters that public choice theory has since
made explicit.35 In any event, the natural result of tricameralism was
to advance the public interest by restraining rent seeking.
Bicameralism and the presidential veto will be considered in
turn. Like a supermajority rule, bicameralism creates a higher hurdle
for legislation because bicameralism requires majority passage in two
chambers rather than one.36 Elsewhere Michael Rappaport and I de-
velop the full argument that bicameralism operates as an implicit su-
permajority rule.37 The electorate often elects individuals with
33. See Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adju-
dication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 585 (2000) (suggesting that the House
of Representatives, the Senate, and the president with his veto power create “an essentially tri-
cameral legislature”).
34. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
72–74 (2001) (observing that bicameralism and presentment ensure that a self-interested group
is unable to capture the legislative process); see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 235–36 (1962) (theorizing that the president will use
his veto power to reject legislative bargains that do not have the approval of the majority of vot-
ers).
35. Hamilton, for instance, focused on the self-regarding laws that the veto would prevent:
[I]t furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws. It estab-
lishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community
against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public
good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis
added). Joseph Story made similar points about bicameralism. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 276 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833)
(“[Bicameralism] operates indirectly as a preventive to attempts to carry private, personal, or
party objects, not connected with the common good.”).
36. See William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow’s Theorem, Article
I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 956
(arguing that Congress’s bicameral structure induces a supermajoritarian system).
37. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 9 (manuscript at 60) (analyzing the way in
which Congress’s bicameral structure affects the political cost of legislation and the power of
special interest groups).
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nonidentical positions on the issues, particularly when the elections
take place at different times and in different jurisdictions (as do the
elections for the House of Representatives and the Senate).38
A bill that obtains majority support in one house may fail in the
other; it will succeed only if it has sufficient support from the voters
that it would obtain passage under supermajoritarian rule.39 The
presidential veto works much like bicameralism in forcing legislation
to obtain more than simple majority support.40 The president is un-
likely to share the exact views of the average member of Congress,
both because the president is elected from a different jurisdiction (the
whole nation) and because the president is elected on the basis of
slightly different issues.41 The president, for instance, has more re-
sponsibility for foreign policy and for appointments to the Supreme
Court.
If the legislature attempts to pass a bill over the president’s veto,
the Constitution imposes an explicit supermajority rule by requiring a
two-thirds vote to override the veto. Upon a veto by the president, a
stronger legislative filter is appropriate because vetoed legislation is
less likely to be beneficial than legislation approved by the presi-
dent.42 In this manner, bicameralism and the presidential veto create a
38. For further discussion, see id. (manuscript at 9–10). The Framers never argued explic-
itly that bicameralism was a supermajority rule but they certainly recognized and welcomed the
higher hurdle it would create for legislation. One of the Framers’ reasons for bicameralism was
to prevent a one-house majority from making hasty and unwise decisions. Indeed, even before
the framing of the Constitution, critics of unicameral chambers complained that a single legisla-
ture was likely to produce bad legislation because of passion and haste. See, e.g., Letter from
William Hooper to the Congress of the State of North Carolina (Oct. 22, 1776), in 10 COLONIAL
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 862, 867 (William L. Saunders ed., 1890) (“A single branch of
Legislation is a many headed Monster which without any check must soon defeat the very pur-
poses for which it was created, and its members become a Tyranny dreadful in proportion to the
numbers which compose it.”). The Framers also were express in their fears that a single body
representing a popular majority would sometimes pass unwise legislation in a moment of politi-
cal passion and therefore wanted to impose a requirement of two separate processes to slow
down the legislation and permit passion to cool. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 379
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting “the propensity of all single and numer-
ous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by fac-
tious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions”).
39. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 9 (manuscript at 9).
40. Id. (manuscript at 10–11).
41. Id.
42. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“The President’s participation in the legisla-
tive process was to protect . . . the whole people from improvident laws.”); see also Manning,
supra note 34, at 73 n.290 (suggesting that the veto serves as a particularly good check on politi-
cal factions because the president is elected by the entire nation).
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mild supermajority rule that presents a greater hurdle to legislation
than simple majority rule in the legislature.
Because a supermajority rule filters legislation in the public in-
terest from special interest legislation, tricameralism may improve the
quality of regulatory legislation.43 With certain simplifying assump-
tions, a supermajority rule is preferable when marginal legislation
(legislation that would be enacted under a simple majority rule but
would be blocked under a supermajority rule) is undesirable.44 It is
certainly plausible that the marginal legislation at issue for the ad-
ministrative state—regulatory legislation that would pass in a uni-
cameral legislature but would fail under tricameralism—is often un-
desirable.
First, a unicameral legislature under majority rule will tend to
produce many undesirable regulatory laws, because, from a global
perspective, more interests favor regulation for self-regarding reasons
than oppose regulation for self-regarding reasons.45 Perhaps most im-
portantly, federal regulators themselves (including legislators and bu-
reaucrats alike) are in favor of more regulation because it increases
their budgets and brings them more status.46 Furthermore, the major-
ity will systematically favor regulation when it can extract resources
from the minority. To be sure, Madison’s large republic tries to guar-
antee that no minority is an enduring target of regulatory or other
kind of oppression.47 Nevertheless, given the imperfect nature of log-
43. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 9 (manuscript at 25) (discussing the ways in
which supermajority rule can improve upon majority rule).
44. See id. (discussing the complications inherent in the simplifying assumptions). That, in
turn, depends on both the efficiency of legislation under majority rule and the degree to which
the supermajority rule will filter bad legislation from good. Id.
45. The discussion that follows offers some reasons to believe that the pressure for special
interest regulation is greater than for special interest deregulation. I have not found a suitable
economic model of this important issue in the literature. An alternative way of suggesting that
the pressure for special interest regulation may be stronger than the special interest pressure
against regulation is to observe that, in a competitive economy, all special interests have an in-
terest in regulation that disadvantages their competitors. See William E. Nelson, The Growth of
Distrust: The Emergence of Hostility Toward Government Regulation of the Economy, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5 (1996) (noting that regulatory schemes can favor some special interests
by burdening competitors with added costs). Only special interests in industries that create ex-
ternalities have an interest in special interest deregulation, namely in eliminating regulations
that are in the public interest.
46. William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 618 n.4
(1975).
47. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 80–81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
see also Larry Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 612 (1999) (arguing that
Madison sought to “[e]xtend the republic’s sphere to include a greater number of parties and
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rolling among coalitions, distinct majorities will use regulation on cer-
tain matters to extract resources from minorities. Finally, there are
special interests, like those Mancur Olson described,48 that are likely
to enjoy greater leverage than the diffuse and inattentive citizenry as
a whole and to seek regulation for their own ends.49
Although some special interests will oppose regulation for self-
regarding reasons,50 the supermajoritarianism implicit in tricameral-
ism may be justified on the basis that these antiregulatory special in-
terests are unlikely, over the whole range of the legislature’s regula-
tory jurisdiction, to counterbalance the sum of the regulatory,
majoritarian, and special interests in favor of regulation.51 Moreover,
because the states offer the prospect of regulation to address exter-
nalities within their own jurisdictions, the class of special interests
that seeks to avoid regulatory competition will also seek an inefficient
federal regulatory regime. Thus, inefficient nationalization of regula-
tion may be a hallmark of the modern nation state.52
Second, the mild supermajority rule created by tricameralism
tends to filter inefficient regulation from efficient regulation. Super-
majority rules make it harder for special interests to succeed because
territory” because he believed that “the very diversity of the society will provide a margin of
safety by, in effect, disabling any group from capturing or controlling government”).
48. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 137–48 (1977) (describing trade and business lobbies).
49. For a more complete discussion of special interest groups, see infra notes 80–83 and
accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1495, 1530 (1999) (discussing the asymmetry of the political process in which special inter-
ests oppose environmental laws).
51. Of course, this balance may not be accurate for all regulation. Therefore, bicameralism
ultimately must be justified because: (1) the hurdles it places in the way of regulation are in the
public interest overall; and (2) it is impossible to define a more limited category of legislation to
which bicameralism would apply. Defining a more refined category—which would presumably
attempt to identify proposed legislation that enjoys disproportionate support from regulatory,
majoritarian, and special interests and would subject only that category of legislation to bicam-
eralism—would raise the administrative costs of bicameralism.
52. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 373–75 (1997) (dis-
cussing the forces motivating national regulation). The interests in favor of inefficient regulation
may well have become even stronger than they were in the Framers’ time. First, the interest of
bureaucrats in favor of excessive regulation may be stronger because the bureaucracy is larger
than it was. Second, the interests that want to avoid jurisdictional competition no longer face the
obstacle of the federal government’s enumerated powers. For more on the growing strength of
these interests, see McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 26, at 394–95. Thus, the case for bicam-
eralism for laws that apply additional regulations may be stronger than it previously was be-
cause there are reasons to suspect that the mix of regulations under majority rule may be more
inefficient overall than it was at the time of the Framers.
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they must gain more than majority support.53 On the other hand, a su-
permajority rule—particularly a mild rule like that implicit in tricam-
eralism—should not prevent the enactment of efficient regulations
because they are more likely to enjoy support from nonspecial inter-
ests and thus garner the requisite supermajoritarian support.54
Moreover, desirable legislation generates social benefits, and those
who benefit from the legislation can compensate those who lose from
it, thereby securing the supermajoritarian support necessary to pass
the measure. Accordingly, if self-regarding interests will cause an in-
efficient mix of regulation under majority rule, a mild supermajority
rule will improve the mix through filtering.55
In any event, the Framers’ bicameral federal system certainly op-
erates on the assumption that a procedure that requires more than
majoritarian support will lead to better legislation. The Framers did
not have a high opinion of the beneficence of legislation that could
not pass the high hurdle of bicameralism and the presidential veto.
Hamilton believed the “inconstancy and mutability in the laws” to be
“the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our govern-
53. For a discussion of the impact of the Constitution’s supermajority voting rules on inter-
est groups, see Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 50, 56, 72–73 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legisla-
tion Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 248
(1986) (contending that the Constitution’s supermajority voting rule raises decision costs for
special interest groups).
54. Our political system generally operates as if supermajority rules filter out undesirable
enactments from desirable enactments. For instance, because constitutional provisions are so
important, the Constitution imposes a dual supermajority rule to screen desirable amendments
from undesirable amendments:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro-
pose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Consti-
tution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification
may be proposed by the Congress . . . .
U.S. CONST. art. V.
55. Certainly, there are costs imposed by supermajority rules. Perhaps the most important
are holdout costs—the costs of empowering minorities who may act strategically in opposing
efficient legislation. But holdout costs are not likely to be very high under a mild supermajority
rule, particularly because most regulatory legislation is unlikely to be very time sensitive. See
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 26, at 420–22 (discussing holdout costs). Holdouts lose their
leverage if there is a substantial possibility that the bill can be passed in a subsequent Congress
when membership has changed slightly. Id. at 422. Administrative costs—the costs of interpret-
ing the supermajority rule—are also low because the rule applies to all legislation and does not
require much judicial interpretation.
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ments.”56 If greater hurdles of bicameralism and presentment pre-
vented some good laws from being enacted, that disadvantage would
be “amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of
bad ones.”57 The purpose of this Essay is less to prove the Framers’
principles in these matters than to show that the regulatory review
order moves toward a structure that better reflects those principles.
Unfortunately, as Michael Rappaport and I discuss at length
elsewhere, bicameralism and the veto power have been circumvented
by government actors’ exploitation of an ambiguity in the concept of
legislation.58 The problem lies in distinguishing legislation on the one
hand and implementation on the other. Because of the imprecision of
language and the costs of legislative deliberation, all legislation leaves
some discretion to the executive in implementation.59 The exercise of
such quasi-legislative discretion, therefore, is not subject to bicamer-
alism and presentment because the executive can exercise it legally.
The lack of these supermajoritarian filters in the exercise of executive
discretion offers the opportunity to circumvent bicameralism and pre-
sentment by recasting matters to be determined by the legislature as
matters to be determined by executive discretion.60
Hence, over time, special interests have urged Congress to grant
broad delegations of legislative power to agencies whose rulemaking
processes can be captured more readily than the complicated and
burdensome legislative process.61 Because such delegation can be
56. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 35, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton).
57. Id.
58. The role of delegation in the circumvention of tricameralism is discussed at length in
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 9, and the description here is an excerpt and summary of
that larger analysis. Here, however, the problem that circumvention causes for presidential con-
trol is discussed in substantially greater depth, because presidential control is obviously of sub-
stantial relevance to the regulatory review and federalism executive orders.
59. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
726 (1997) (“Incidental to discharging their respective constitutional functions of law execution
and adjudication, agencies . . . must expound the meaning of the texts they implement, leaving
more or less room for the exercise of discretion.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 326 (2000) (“The distinction between ‘executive’ and ‘legislative’ power
cannot depend on anything qualitative; the issue is a quantitative one.”).
60. I do not claim that the only reason for delegation has been circumvention of bicamer-
alism and the presidential veto. There may well be bona fide reasons for delegation, such as
Congress’s need to rely on the greater expertise of executive agencies. The only propositions
here are that special interests, over time, will seek to circumvent the constitutional provisions
designed to constrain them and that delegation has sometimes been used to accomplish this end.
61. The academic literature on the ability of interest groups to capture agencies is vast. See,
e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669, 1684–87 (1975) (providing a summary of the discussion of agency capture). Here I do not
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made to seem reasonable, an inattentive public cannot easily mobilize
to defeat such delegations.62 The citizenry thus cannot police circum-
vention of the supermajority rules implicit in bicameralism and the
presidential veto.63 The rise of the modern administrative state has
created the possibility of massive substitution of administrative dis-
cretion for the original restraints of bicameralism and presentment.64
It might be argued that excessive delegation circumvents only bi-
cameralism and not presentment because such regulations are made
through executive regulation: the president, as head of the executive
branch, still must decide whether to issue regulations within the ambit
of his discretion under his delegated authority. But this argument de-
pends on the premise that the president himself issues regulations in
the same manner that he signs or vetoes bills. This premise is false
practically, and at least according to conventional wisdom, false for-
mally as well. As a practical matter, government agency heads issue
most regulations under delegations directly from Congress.65 As a
formal matter, it is generally thought that the president is not re-
make the claim that special interests always capture agencies; I only assert the more modest
claim that, as a general matter, special interests are more likely to capture agencies than they
are to capture all the entities in the tricameral process. See Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction
Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional
Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 513 (1988) (describing the relative difficulties that interest groups
face when attempting to capture the legislative process).
62. Rational ignorance describes the systematic tendency of diffuse citizens to pay little
attention to political information. The phenomenon occurs because acquiring political informa-
tion is both costly and unproductive. It is costly because, to acquire such information, individu-
als must invest time that they could be using for other more lucrative or pleasurable enterprises.
Likewise, it is unproductive because the principal use of such information is to guide voting, but
the vote of any individual is unlikely to influence the outcome of an election. MUELLER, supra
note 13, at 205–06.
63. Members of Congress have no incentives to police such delegations because the delega-
tions frequently are to their advantage. Such delegation allows Congress to satisfy interest
groups while shifting responsibility to agencies for rules that may flout the public interest. Peter
H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 57 (1982). It also
allows them to avoid conflict about which interests to satisfy. Id. at 61.
64. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1248–49 (1994) (“Administrative agencies routinely combine all these governmental func-
tions in the same body, and even in the same people within that body.”).
65. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2327–28 (2001)
(describing the normal practice of delegation to agencies). Of course, sometimes Congress dele-
gates power to the president himself on the understanding that he may then delegate the power
to a subordinate official. Id. at 2329.
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quired to sign off on administrative regulations and that his signature
is not needed to make such regulations effective.66
Moreover, the president faces political costs in enforcing his will
when he finds that an agency head does not wish to follow his direc-
tion.67 While most agency heads serve at the pleasure of the president,
they have a degree of autonomy because firing an agency head is po-
litically costly to the president.68 The president will not fire the agency
head if the agency head’s regulatory agenda imposes fewer political
costs than firing him would. Furthermore, the president also faces the
typical problems of any principal in monitoring the actions of his
agents.69
In particular, a modern agency head’s agenda tends to diverge
from that of the president because the agency head faces a different
incentive structure than the president. We are far from the era in
which Cincinnatus, having fulfilled his civic duties, simply retired to
66. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 25 (1995) (“[T]he President has no authority to make the decision himself, at least if
Congress has conferred the relevant authority on an agency head.”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place
of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
573, 665–66 (1984) (suggesting that the authority to issue regulations remains with the agency
head, subject to “whatever political discipline the President might bring to bear”). For a chal-
lenge to the conventional wisdom, see Kagan, supra note 65, at 2326–27 (arguing that the presi-
dent has the authority to revise decisions of subordinates without their consent so long as Con-
gress has not legislated clearly to the contrary).
 I recognize that some have argued that the president, instead of the agency head to
whom Congress regulates authority, has the constitutional authority to issue regulations. E.g.,
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541, 594–95 (1994). Although I have some sympathy with this view as a matter of first
principles, it has no support in Supreme Court case law and its leading proponents concede that
it requires more academic analysis than it has received to be fully persuasive. Id. at 595 n.208.
Thus, on the conventional understanding of the president’s power over agencies, which relies on
his supervisory and removal authority rather than his authority to displace agency regulations
directly, I argue that the regulatory review executive order restores presidential power to some-
thing more akin to his veto power. If the argument of Professors Calabresi and Prakash is ac-
cepted, the president always has had a power over administrative regulation that would, if exer-
cised, compensate him for the loss of the veto under broad delegations that have characterized
the modern administrative state.
67. See Kagan, supra note 65, at 2273 (describing the problem of presidential monitoring as
a “typical principal-agent dilemma: how to ensure against slippage between the behavior the
principal desires from the agent and the behavior the principal actually receives, given the
agent’s own norms, interests, and informational advantages”).
68. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 25 (discussing the political costs to the presi-
dent of firing agency heads).
69. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 88 (1994) (noting that the president faces an “ubiquitous principal-agent
problem”).
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his farm.70 Instead, the modern appointee on retirement from a high
government position is likely to look forward to the enjoyment of
higher income and status by virtue of his position.71 The extent of this
enhanced status and income will depend on his network of friends
and supporters and the general reputation in the press that he has ac-
quired by virtue of his government actions.72 Needless to say, the ac-
tions that would optimize the agency head’s future stream of income
and reputational benefits will not necessarily be compatible with the
president’s agenda at all times.
Moreover, a realist analysis of the agency process would suggest
that special interest groups will have substantial success at influencing
the particular agencies whose regulatory agenda matter most to them.
For instance, special interests can be expected to provide contribu-
tions to congressional committee members with influence over these
agencies in return for access to and consideration of their concerns by
the agencies that most affect them.73 For these reasons as well, the
president’s authority over regulations does not compensate for the
loss of the filter provided by the veto power.74
Therefore, because of monitoring and termination costs—costs
that are built into the constitutional structure of the executive
branch—delegation to agencies does not provide assurance that an
official who represents a majority of the nation’s citizens will approve
70. See John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General’s Office in Con-
stitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799, 809 (1992) (discussing the reasons for
the decline of Cincinnatus’s ideal as the model for government service).
71. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 708
(2000) (discussing the power of the “revolving door” in which political appointees stay in gov-
ernment for approximately two years and then move to the private sector).
72. For a discussion of the importance of networks and revolving doors in executive agen-
cies, see Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1330 (1997).
73. For this reason, I reject the argument of those who suggest that the oversight process
helps create a process that approximates the function of bicameralism. Because committees are
much more easily captured by particular special interests than Congress is as a whole, and be-
cause the membership of congressional committees is often quite unrepresentative of Congress,
committee oversight is less likely than the high hurdles of bicameralism to be a guardian of the
public interest. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Politi-
cal Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991) (“[The] committee structure can exacerbate interest
group influence.”).
74. It might be argued that special interest groups have similar leverage over the presi-
dent’s decision whether to sign or veto a bill. Certainly, special interests have disproportionate
leverage at the presidential signing stage of the political process as well, but the disproportion is
even greater at the agency level because agency action is less visible and transparent to the pub-
lic than the president’s actions.
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of the regulation. Delegations in the modern administrative state still
risk the loss of the constraints on special interest rent seeking that bi-
cameralism and the presidential veto were designed to afford.
II.  THE CHANGING WORLD OF POLITICS
A. Political Theory
The federalism and regulatory review executive orders compen-
sate for the decline of federalism and tricameralism. As this Essay
shows, the president has an interest in arresting this constitutional de-
cline because his fortunes—more than those of any other public ac-
tor—are dependent on economic growth. The reason the public looks
to him for economic growth is not unrelated to the centralization of
power that accompanied constitutional decline: the national leader is
now understood as a manager of the economy.75 The timing of the ex-
ecutive orders, however, has been dictated by the growing recognition
that the centralization that began in the New Deal has substantially
hindered governance in the public interest and tamped down on eco-
nomic growth.
Today, the political world (and the political theories used to map
it) looks very different than it did in the era in which political theo-
rists celebrated the decline of federalism and the rise of the adminis-
trative state. Skepticism has grown about the government as a ra-
tional planner of social reform because the centralized reforms of the
New Deal and the Great Society are widely believed to have had
counterproductive consequences and, in some cases, to have been
downright failures.76 The failures of these reforms are also congruent
with deeper difficulties that fueled the growth of the administrative
state. Public choice theory has cast doubt in various ways on the co-
herence and efficacy of collective decisionmaking.77 In particular,
public choice theory has shown that what the Framers called fac-
tions—now known as special interests—may be able to exercise po-
litical power out of proportion to their numbers to obtain resources
75. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 65, at 2310 (“The American public harbors high and rising
expectations about what a President should be able to accomplish.”).
76. See generally, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984) (describing the fail-
ures of antipoverty programs launched in the 1960s).
77. See MUELLER, supra note 13, at 406 (discussing modern theorems that “raise funda-
mental questions about the possibility of satisfying collective choice procedures establishing
minimally appealing normative properties”).
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and status for themselves.78 In contrast, because the diffuse citizenry
has little leverage over centralized democracy, its inattention to gov-
ernment policy is rational and therefore intractable.79 For these rea-
sons, interest groups have additional advantages in gaining resources
from the government at the public expense.
Social changes have exacerbated both of these trends. The sus-
ceptibility of the national government to special interests has in-
creased. The declining costs of information transmission have in-
creased the ability of interest groups to influence government.80 As a
result of these changes, interest groups are better able to organize and
monitor the benefits that accrue to their members, thus avoiding the
free-rider problems that previously had frustrated their efforts.81 They
are also better able to monitor members of Congress, thus eroding
legislators’ ability to act independently.82 In contrast, the average citi-
zen has become less focused on government activities because the
consumption value of politics has declined—with literally hundreds of
channels for entertainment, politics has trouble competing, and thus
the average citizen rationally spends less time considering political is-
sues.83
78. OLSON, supra note 48, at 132–34. Special interest groups exert their influence in the
political process in a variety of ways. First, they are able to monitor what is actually transpiring
in the political process. See, e.g., Michael A. Andrews, Tax Simplification, 47 SMU L. REV. 37,
42 (1993) (discussing how special interest groups have affected the process of tax legislation).
Second, special interests often can use experts to persuade legislators of their position. See, e.g.,
Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma
of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 17–21 (1984) (describing the role of investment bankers in
persuading Congress to enact legislation prohibiting commercial banks from competing with
investment banks). Third, special interests are able to conduct a coordinated and coherent cam-
paign to publicize their position in the media. See, e.g., William Dubinsky, Book Note, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 1512, 1514 (1992) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW
AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991)) (“Special interest groups can provide legislators . . . with pub-
licity . . . .”). Finally, special interests also may exercise greater leverage over legislators through
campaign contributions or independent political expenditures. See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein,
Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 826–28 (1985)
(evaluating the power of special interest group contributions).
79. See supra note 62.
80. See Peter H. Schuck, Against (and For) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 553, 580 (1997) (explaining how special interest groups inform and rep-
resent their members).
81. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice
Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1336–37 (1994) (discussing the free-rider problem for fac-
tions).
82. Id.
83. John O. McGinnis, The Partial Republican, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1751, 1791 (1994)
(reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)).
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The critique of the efficacy of centralized government has power-
fully eroded the New Deal paradigm of the administrative state.84 In
1938, James Landis, then dean of the Harvard Law School, argued
that, in view of modern problems, the administrative process should
replace an outdated “tripartite” system of government, with confi-
dence that unsupervised expert agencies would exercise broad delega-
tions of power for the public good.85 But by 1960 Landis had become
substantially disillusioned, suggesting that agencies lacked public
spirit and were subject to undue influence by their regulated indus-
tries.86 As a consequence, he was an early advocate of greater presi-
dential control.87 By the 1970s, economists had explained more rigor-
ously the reasons that agencies tended to be captured by special
interests and thus frustrate the public interest and hamper long-term
economic growth.88 The administrative state needed to be restruc-
tured to reflect these social truths, a need that ultimately led to the is-
suance of the regulatory review and federalism executive orders.
Moreover, given the perceived advantages of the market and the pa-
thologies of centralized government, regulatory competition among
the states naturally appeared to be a more sensible way of organizing
society.
As these changes in intellectual outlook are assimilated, it is not
surprising that the polity is looking for ways of returning to pre–New
Deal limitations on government.89 The president is the appropriate in-
strument for that restoration because he has more interest in it than
84. See Paul R. Verkuil, Understanding the “Public Interest” Justification for Government
Actions, 39 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 141, 146–47 (1998) (describing the decline in the pub-
lic’s belief that administrative agencies act for the public interest).
85. JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1, 9 (1938). Landis had great confi-
dence in experts to replace the messy system of politics. See id. at 23 (discussing the value of ex-
perts). For an excellent discussion of the course of Landis’s views, see John F. Duffy, The FCC
and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regula-
tion, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1084–86 (2000).
86. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE TO THE SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-
ELECT 14 (Comm. Print 1960) (written by James Landis); Duffy, supra note 85, at 1114 (ex-
plaining the change in Landis’s views).
87. Duffy, supra note 85, at 1115.
88. The classic article is George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL. J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (discussing industrial groups’ ability to use the administrative
state to their own ends).
89. The most noted Democratic recognition of these changes was former President Bill
Clinton’s recognition that “the era of big government is over.” Alison Mitchell, Clinton Offers
Challenge to Nation, Declaring ‘Era of Big Government is Over,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at
A1 (quoting President Clinton’s State of the Union Address).
MCGINNIS.DOC 02/05/02 10:35 AM
2001] PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW 923
any other national governmental actor. The public may be rationally
ignorant of most issues, but they care about the economy and hold
the president responsible for it. The challenge for the president is to
capitalize on the public’s interest in economic growth and use it to
recreate structures of good governance—through executive orders.
B. The Executive Orders
Elected on a platform of restoring the authority of the states,90
President Ronald Reagan promulgated a federalism executive order,
Executive Order 12,612.91 The order reasserts the doctrine of enu-
merated powers and declares that political liberties are best protected
by limiting the size and scope of the federal government.92 It man-
dates that executive branch agencies under the control of the presi-
dent recognize the distinction between what is best regulated nation-
ally and what is best regulated locally.93
In addition, the federalism order permits federal agencies to pre-
empt state law only when a statute contains language clearly showing
that Congress intended to preempt state law.94 It mandates consulta-
tion with state and local officials to avoid conflicts between state and
federal law.95 In contrast to the operation of the regulatory review or-
der which is monitored by the Office of Management and Budget, an
official in each department is made responsible for monitoring com-
pliance with the federalism executive order.96
After promulgating and withdrawing a federalism executive or-
der,97 President Clinton’s final federalism order, Executive Order
13,132,98 does not differ substantially from President Reagan’s. It too
reiterates the importance of federalism and suggests that “national ac-
90. See Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (June 20, 1981), in JAMES M.
MCPHERSON, “TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY”: THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 442, 443 (2000)
(“It is my intention . . . to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to
the Federal Government and those reserved to the States . . . .”).
91. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3
C.F.R. 206 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
92. Id., 3 C.F.R. at 252–53.
93. Id. § 3(b)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 254.
94. Id. § 4(a)–(b), 3 C.F.R. at 255.
95. Id. § 4(d), 3 C.F.R. at 255.
96. Id. § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. at 255.
97. For a description of President Clinton’s first federalism order and its suspension, see
Jennie Holman Blake, Presidential Power Grab or Pure State Might? A Modern Debate over
Executive Interpretations of Federalism, 2000 BYU L. REV. 293, 299–301.
98. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
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tion” should be taken in response to problems of “national signifi-
cance.”99 Although not setting forth a test as to what constitutes a na-
tional or local problem, Clinton’s federalism order directs agencies to
“consult with appropriate State and local officials to determine
whether Federal objectives can be attained by other means.”100 It also
requires clear evidence of Congress’s intention to preempt before
permitting preemption, although the standard is slightly less emphatic
than that in President Reagan’s order.101 The order continues to re-
quire each agency head to designate someone to be responsible for
enforcing the order.102 Clinton’s federalism order added the additional
requirement that agencies provide, to the extent permitted by law, a
waiver process to allow states that are accomplishing the same objec-
tives with their own laws to be exempted from those aspects of a fed-
eral regulatory regime.103
Elected on a platform of restoring limited government as well as
federalism,104 President Reagan issued the regulatory review order,
Executive Order 12,291,105 shortly after he took office. The order re-
quired the agencies whose heads served at his pleasure to submit their
major regulatory proposals to OIRA, a unit of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB), together with a “regulatory impact
analysis.”106 Only after OIRA signed off on their orders were the
agencies permitted to issue the regulations; there were no time limits
to the period OIRA could demand for completion of its review.107 The
order also established cost-benefit analysis as the overarching princi-
ple that would govern regulation, insofar as that principle was consis-
tent with the agency’s statutory framework.108 Later, President
99. Id. § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. at 208.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 4(a)–(b), 3 C.F.R. at 208.
102. Id. § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. at 209.
103. Id. § 7(a)–(d), 3 C.F.R. at 210.
104. See Reagan, supra note 90, at 443 (“It is my intention to curb the size and influence of
the Federal establishment . . . .”).
105. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3
C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
106. Id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. at 128–30. Although Executive Order 12,291 requires agency heads to
submit major regulatory proposals to the director of OMB, OIRA carries out OMB’s functions
under the executive order. For a description of OIRA’s role in the process that is governed by
Executive Order 12,291, see generally Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency
Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533 (1989).
107. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3, 3 C.F.R. at 128–30.
108. Id. § 3(d), 3 C.F.R. at 129.
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Reagan issued another order, Executive Order 12,498,109 that required
agencies to provide an annual regulatory agenda, thus giving OIRA
more advance warning of what regulations to expect.
These orders continued in force during the presidency of George
Bush, President Reagan’s successor. In 1992, President Clinton was
elected as a “new Democrat,” a Democrat who was sensitive to the
costs of excessive government.110 President Clinton issued Executive
Order 12,866,111 which maintained the principal objectives and struc-
tures of the Reagan executive orders while making some important
changes. First, President Clinton modified the cost-benefit provisions,
making it clear that government would take into account soft as well
as hard costs and consider the “equity” and “distributive” conse-
quences of regulation.112 In response to critics of the secrecy of the
regulatory review process,113 the new regulatory review order also re-
quired very substantial disclosure—it decreed that in the OIRA re-
view process only the administrator could be lobbied orally by third
parties and that the content of these contacts must be disclosed.114 A
log of all written and oral communications with OIRA must be kept,
and the log must be disclosed to the public.115 Moreover, the order re-
quires that all communication between OIRA and the regulatory
agency be disclosed after a final order is issued or the decision is
made not to promulgate a final order.116 In response to criticisms of
the undue delays that OIRA imposed,117 Clinton’s order imposes strict
limits on the time OIRA can spend evaluating an agency’s regula-
tions.118 The order also expressly contemplates that the president, or
109. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985).
110. See Richard Benedetto, Dem Group Prods Clinton Toward Center, USA TODAY, Dec.
3, 1993, at 4A (discussing the manner in which President Clinton had campaigned as a supporter
of a centrist government opposed to big government solutions to social problems).
111. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
112. Id. § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 638–39.
113. See, e.g., Michael Fix & George C. Eads, The Prospects for Regulatory Reform: The
Legacy of Reagan’s First Term, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 315 (1985) (discussing the controversy
over the secrecy of the OIRA regulatory review process).
114. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(A), 3 C.F.R. at 647.
115. Id. § 6(b)(4), 3 C.F.R. at 647–48.
116. Id. § 6(b)(4)(D), 3 C.F.R. at 648.
117. See, e.g., Bruff, supra note 106, at 567 (discussing various criticisms of OIRA’s ability to
delay agency action).
118. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 646–47 (requiring OIRA to review pro-
posed regulations within ninety days and providing for one thirty-day extension).
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the vice-president acting at the president’s direction, can settle dis-
putes between OIRA and a regulatory agency.119
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL RESTORATION THROUGH
PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW
A. Reviving Constitutional Federalism
The president is the political actor most likely to revive the vir-
tues of the Framers’ federalism. To be sure, federal legislators are
closer to their individual states than the president. But they are inter-
ested in the welfare of people in their individual states, not the wel-
fare of the nation as a whole. Indeed, unlike the contribution that
federalism makes to economic growth through jurisdictional competi-
tion, the geographic nature of representation at the federal level de-
tracts from economic growth. For instance, each legislator has an in-
centive to bring back pork barrel legislation for his state despite the
economic losses this causes the nation.120 In the case of spending, the
representational nature of federalism can cause a geographic tragedy
of the commons in which each representative has an incentive to
overgraze the federal budget at the expense of the nation’s economic
prosperity. Exactly the same incentives work to the disadvantage of
the nation at the regulatory level: each individual representative
wants to obtain a regulatory framework that benefits his state even if
it hurts the nation as a whole.
In contrast to their interest in bringing back pork, federal legisla-
tors do not have as strong an interest in strengthening state auton-
omy.121 Protecting autonomy has benefits that are much less visible to
voters and thus do not advance the career prospects of politicians.122
Additionally, more powerful states mean more powerful state offi-
119. Id. § 7, 3 C.F.R. at 648.
120. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 35 (1995) (discussing the incentives for legislators to bring home pork).
121. The existence of unfunded mandates—federal orders to state and local governments to
provide services without corresponding funds—provides powerful evidence that federal officials
have a weak interest in the autonomy of state governments. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky,
Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public
Interest, and Public Service, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355 (1993) (offering various reasons for why
federal legislators do not resist unfunded mandates).
122. The loss of state autonomy is a rather diffuse phenomenon that is not traceable to fed-
eral legislators. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 18–19
(1972) (demonstrating that legislators pay attention to actions that are traceable to them).
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cials, and these officials represent an important source of competition
for federal legislators for reelection (or, in the case of members of the
House of Representatives, for both reelection and promotion to the
Senate). Moreover, even if individual members of the legislature want
to strengthen state autonomy, they cannot achieve this goal as easily
as they can succeed in bringing back pork. Pork barrel legislation cre-
ates no free-rider problems among legislators: all legislators are re-
warded with pork for their own districts if they support similar legisla-
tion for others.123 State autonomy brings no such individualized
payoffs because the autonomy of all states is increased by the action
of an individual senator protecting state autonomy. Given this free-
rider problem, it will be difficult to mobilize the critical mass of legis-
lative support needed to achieve a restoration of state authority
through federal legislation.
With the dissolution of competitive federalism permitted by the
Supreme Court,124 the principal remnant of the system of constitu-
tional federalism—the election of national legislators from geo-
graphically based districts—may do more harm than good. It assures
a steady stream of pork and regulatory parochialism without sustain-
ing the regulatory competition that might help the nation’s economic
growth. One way to understand this point is to recognize that feder-
alism in the Constitution has two aspects: governmental federalism
and representational federalism. Governmental federalism gave re-
sponsibility to the states for areas of governance (largely in areas in
which there was little likelihood of interjurisdictional spillovers).125
Representational federalism makes representation in the federal gov-
ernment dependent on support in particular states rather than in na-
tional at-large elections.
Perhaps arguments can be made that representational federalism
is useful to protect governmental federalism from collapsing from the
consolidation of all power in the federal government.126 Nevertheless,
123. See Lee Anderson, Oink, Oink, It’s Pork Time in Washington, CHATTANOOGA TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2000, at B7 (explaining that the operative principle for pork-barrel spending is “[y]ou
scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours”).
124. For a discussion of the dissolution of constitutional federalism, see supra notes 13–32
and accompanying text.
125. The advantages of this system are described supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text.
126. I am a little skeptical of those arguments. The key to representing states’ interests in
the original Constitution was not simply having the representatives elected from the states but
having some of those representatives elected by state legislatures—a constituency powerfully
focused on state autonomy. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
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when divorced from the system of governmental federalism, repre-
sentational federalism has serious defects. More bluntly, constitu-
tional changes since the New Deal have retained the defects of repre-
sentational federalism—dominance by parochial factions through
local representation—but added the defects of centralized regulation
that comes from dissolving governmental federalism and giving ple-
nary power to the national legislature.
But the pathologies that flow from this system have become so
palpable that they set the stage for new ways of reconstituting a fed-
eralism that preserves liberty and generates wealth. Here the presi-
dent is the leading actor on the set. First, the electoral fortunes of the
president and his successor are more dependent on economic growth
than those of national legislators.127 Moreover, unlike national legisla-
tors, the president has no free-rider problems in enforcing a system of
competitive federalism. The president also should be less reluctant
than national legislators to cede power to state officials because even
more substantially empowered state officials are not going to over-
shadow the president. Finally, the federalist structure of the electoral
college also gives the president an interest in appeasing state officials,
particularly state governors, because governors and state party com-
mittees play an important role in presidential elections.128
The president’s role in restoring the framework of restraints that
contribute to economic growth has deep historical roots. As Mancur
Olson has observed, monarchs who enjoyed stable control over their
territory had incentives to create the conditions for economic
growth.129 To this end they created rule-of-law institutions, like courts,
and tried to keep the peace.130 The president’s role is similar, with ad-
127. See Ray C. Fair, Econometrics and Presidential Elections, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
1996, at 89–90 (concluding from a study of all American elections since 1916 that the growth of
per capita output in the year of the election was the most important factor in determining
whether the party of the incumbent president retained the presidency).
128. See JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A
DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 156–57 (1971) (describing the importance of state
party machinery in presidential elections under the electoral college system).
129. See Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
567, 571 (1993) (discussing the advantages that monarchy had over roving bands in generating
prosperity). One can think of legislators as behaving a little like roving bands in trying to take
back pork (as well as regulations that will help their region) to their constituents at the expense
of the commonwealth.
130. Id. Olson was not the first to see the advantages that a monarch had over roving bands
or warring city-states in creating the conditions for prosperity. Dante argued that monarchy best
led to a polity in which each person could pursue his highest good. See R.W.B. LEWIS, DANTE
128 (2001) (explaining that, in Dante’s view, monarchy is a prerequisite for universal peace).
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ditional benefits provided by modern democracy. Monarchs’ incen-
tives lay in the greater taxes and other exactions that they could ac-
crue with greater economic growth. The president’s incentives are the
prospect of reelection—his own or that of his party’s successor—and
his historical reputation, and therefore he does not take his exactions
directly at the expense of the people.131 The voting citizenry provides
these incentives, because although citizens may not know much about
the details of government policy, they appear to hold the president
responsible for economic growth.132
Of course, the president is not going to be a perfect enforcer of
federalism. He also has factions that he wants to satisfy at the expense
of long-term growth. But he is likely to prove better at preserving
federalism because he has a strong countervailing interest in con-
tinuing economic growth for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the
federalism executive order (and the regulatory review order as well)
can act as a precommitment device.133 It thus enables the president to
make it more difficult for himself to heed the pleas of these factions at
the expense of this overriding interest. More to the point, perhaps,
the federalism executive order may redirect these factions to other
sources of rents or status that are unlikely to interfere with competi-
tive federalism.134
Although President Reagan issued the federalism executive or-
der, President Clinton continued the order, thus showing that the
movement toward presidential enforcement of federalism may be be-
yond partisan politics.135 Although neither order is explicit about re-
storing constitutional federalism per se, both resurrect key concepts
in distinguishing between what is best regulated locally and what is
131. See Calabresi, supra note 120, at 67–68 (suggesting that the president is responsive to
the majority coalition that placed him in office).
132. See supra note 127.
133. For a discussion of the role of precommitment devices in democratic governance, see
JOHN ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 88–96 (1979).
134. Of course, the president can change his executive order with the stroke of the pen, but
this would be embarrassing, and thus an executive order can serve as a precommitment device
despite the possibility of waiver. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitu-
tionality of Legislative Supermajority Rules: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 510–11 (1995) (dis-
cussing the value of a supermajority legislative rule applicable to raising taxes in light of the fact
that the rule could be waived).
135. It is true that President Clinton’s first version of the executive order was criticized par-
ticularly by state officials as cutting back on the strong federalism of the Reagan executive or-
der. That order was suspended and the final version was very similar to Reagan’s executive or-
der. See Blake, supra note 97, at 299–301; supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
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best regulated nationally and directing agencies to focus only on na-
tional problems.136
The kind of competitive federalism the presidential executive or-
der enforces could enjoy some advantages over the constitutional
federalism the Court enforced in the pre–New Deal era. During that
time, the Court determined what the federal government could regu-
late and what was reserved to the states on the basis of rigid catego-
ries (e.g., commerce, labor, manufacturing).137 The problem with such
categorical distinctions is that they may not permit the federal gov-
ernment to regulate all matters that create interstate externalities
(and thus that cannot be addressed optimally by interstate competi-
136. Exec. Order No. 12,612 § 3(b)(1), 3 C.F.R. 252, 254 (1987), revoked by Exec. Order No.
13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). The order states:
In most areas of governmental concern, the States uniquely possess the constitutional
authority, the resources, and the competence to discern the sentiments of the people
and to govern accordingly. In Thomas Jefferson’s words, the States are “the most
competent administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest bulwarks against
antirepublican tendencies.”
Id. § 2(e), 3 C.F.R. at 253. The order continues, “It is important to recognize the distinction be-
tween problems of national scope (which may justify Federal action) and problems that are
merely common to the States (which will not justify Federal action because individual States,
acting individually or together, can effectively deal with them).” Id. § 3(b)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 254.
Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 1(f), 3 C.F.R. 206, 207 (1999) states:
The nature of our constitutional system encourages a healthy diversity in the public
policies adopted by the people of the several States according to their own conditions,
needs, and desires. In the search for enlightened public policy, individual States and
communities are free to experiment with a variety of approaches to public issues.
One-size-fits-all approaches to public policy problems can inhibit the creation of ef-
fective solutions to those problems.
It continues:
National action limiting the policymaking discretion of the States shall be taken only
where there is constitutional and statutory authority for the action and the national
activity is appropriate in light of the presence of a problem of national significance.
Where there are significant uncertainties as to whether national action is authorized
or appropriate, agencies shall consult with appropriate State and local officials to de-
termine whether Federal objectives can be attained by other means.
Id. § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. at 208.
137. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 14 (1895):
Manufacture is transformation—the fashioning of raw materials into a change of form
for use. The functions of commerce are different . . . . If it be held that the term in-
cludes the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended to be the subject of
commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it would also in-
clude all productive industries that contemplate the same thing. The result would be
that Congress would be invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to
regulate, not only manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, do-
mestic fisheries, mining—in short, every branch of human industry.
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tion).138 For instance, there is some question whether under the pre–
New Deal distinction under the Commerce Clause the federal govern-
ment could regulate a polluter that was engaged in interstate pollu-
tion.139
In contrast, the federalism executive order would allow the
president and his advisers the flexibility to make economically sound
judgments about what is best regulated locally and what is best regu-
lated nationally, taking into account both the advantages of jurisdic-
tional competition and the advantages of national harmonization.140
For instance, under either President Reagan’s or President Clinton’s
executive orders, the federal government undoubtedly would be able
to address interstate environmental problems that manufacturers cre-
ated. In short, the president is not limited by formalism and could
help implement a more effective system of competitive federalism.
But the virtues of informality are also potential vices. A prag-
matic federalism will have much greater difficulty resisting the calls
for the federal government to do something about the political im-
perative of the day, even if the problem does not have substantial
spillovers. Some of these imperatives are manufactured by interest
groups that would benefit from unjustified centralization.141 Others
are the result of the passions and rational ignorance of ordinary citi-
zens. Federalism is a structural principle that restrains interest groups,
but, for this reason, interest groups are largely hostile to it. Moreover,
because it is a structural principle, citizens are largely indifferent to it
when it conflicts with issues that stir their passions. Ultimately, a rigid
constitutional structure, like that of our original constitutional feder-
alism, may be more impermeable to the acids of interest group rent
seeking and political passions.142
138. See Nelson Lund, Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1997)
(describing the difficulties federalism presents in generating an optimal level of efficiency be-
cause its costs and benefits are so closely intertwined).
139. See A. Dan Tarlock, Safe Drinking Water: A Federalism Perspective, 21 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 251–52 (1997) (questioning whether the Supreme Court’s new
bright lines in its Commerce Clause decisions will permit federal regulation of the environ-
ment).
140. I have previously suggested, however, that when jurisdictional competition is working
well, it will be conducive to the optimal amount of national harmonization. McGinnis & Movse-
sian, supra note 16, at 561.
141. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 16, at 543 n.189 (discussing interest group
schemes to obtain more centralized regulatory structures).
142.  But such rigid rules may be enforceable only when individuals have strong, elemental
attachments to their states—attachments that may have dissipated because of the decrease in
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Nevertheless, much of government regulation concerns matters
that, although important, do not stir great political passions. As to
these matters, the presidential order can be an effective counter-
weight to federal bureaucracies’ natural tendency to impose federal
solutions. Thus, even if the federalism executive order does not re-
store federalism to its former glory, it may be the most substantial re-
vival possible in the current polity.
B. Reviving Tricameralism
The process of regulatory review can best be understood as an
attempt to compensate for the decline of bicameralism and the presi-
dential veto occasioned by delegation. The OIRA review process en-
visioned in the regulatory review order facilitates this restoration in
three ways. First, by requiring OIRA review of major regulatory or-
ders, it reduces the president’s monitoring costs and restores in some
measure the president’s original role in influencing the content of co-
ercive impositions on citizens.143 Second, it introduces another level of
bureaucracy that must be navigated before a regulatory proposal be-
comes binding on citizens.144 This bureaucracy has a different culture
from the agencies and is influenced by different factions.145 By intro-
ducing another screen, it also recreates some semblance of bicamer-
alism’s two hurdles to the enactment of binding laws. Finally, al-
though the procedural requirements of the executive order attempt to
mimic the processes of bicameralism and presentment,146 the regula-
tory review executive order also attempts to achieve the goals of these
constitutional cornerstones through a new substantive requirement.
The federal government should provide only public goods, including
information costs and the rise of a mass culture. See John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s
America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2002) (manuscript at 35, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (presenting different ex-
planations for the disappearance of state attachments).
143. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128–30 (1981) (providing for centralized re-
view of agency regulations), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000); Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 638, 644–48 (same).
144. The review is conducted by a separate bureaucracy, OIRA, located in OMB. See Exec.
Order No. 12,866 § 6, 3 C.F.R. at 644–48; supra note 106 and accompanying text.
145. As discussed, infra, at notes 162–68 and accompanying text, OIRA is much more di-
rectly influenced by the president and is therefore more easily influenced by factions that are
influential with presidents.
146. Analogously, the line item veto attempts to increase the power of the presidential veto
in appropriation matters because the practice of omnibus bills has reduced the effectiveness of
the presidential veto. The version of the line item veto that Congress most recently enacted was
invalidated in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998).
MCGINNIS.DOC 02/05/02 10:35 AM
2001] PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW 933
regulations, that other institutions, like the family and the market, ei-
ther cannot provide or cannot provide as efficiently.147 The cost-
benefit analysis requirement encapsulates this goal, filtering regula-
tions that meet this criterion from those that do not.
As discussed in connection with the federalism executive order,
the president is now the logical candidate for reviving normative
structures that restrain special interests or factions.148 Because special
interest legislation depresses long-term economic growth, the presi-
dent, as the national leader most closely tied to the prospects of eco-
nomic growth, is most likely to consider structures to reduce the inci-
dence of special interest legislation.149
Moreover, unlike the Supreme Court, the president is a politi-
cally accountable official and has the legitimacy to make policy-based
judgments. The Court could attempt to adopt formal rules proscribing
excessive delegation by reviving the nondelegation doctrine.150 But it
is difficult to draw clear lines to quantify the excesses of delegation,
and given this lack of clarity, the Supreme Court could be accused of
hiding behind a patina of legal neutrality to advance its political
agenda.151 In any event, the Court shows no signs of reviving the non-
delegation doctrine, most recently passing up the opportunity to af-
firm a lower court’s use of the doctrine to invalidate an environ-
mental law.152 Just as the Court’s failure to revive economic federalism
strengthens the case for the president’s role in the reconstruction of
147. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. at 128 (mandating cost-benefit analysis); Exec.
Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. at 639 (same).
148. See supra notes 127–34 and accompanying text.
149. Some kinds of special interest regulation, such as regulations shaped by polluters that
fail to make producers pay the full cost of pollution, can help short-term growth. But in the long
term, the costs of rectifying the externalities that regulations have failed to correct will hurt
long-term growth.
150. The nondelegation doctrine enforces the constitutional provision that “[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of
a Senate and House of Representatives.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Therefore, Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to one outside the legislative branch, like the president. Delegation
also can be conceived as a violation of the separation of powers. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (“[I]n carrying out that constitutional division into three
branches it is a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives up its legislative power
and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial Branch . . . .”). For an excellent discussion of
the roots of the nondelegation doctrine, see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safe-
guard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1373–77 (2001).
151. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 345, 353
(1987) (discussing the charge that the nondelegation doctrine represents the political agenda of
deregulation).
152. Massachusetts v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1222, 1222 (2001).
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federalism, the Court’s failure to prevent circumventions of bicamer-
alism through excessive delegation strengthens the case for the presi-
dent’s creation of substitute restraints on special interest legislation.153
For similar reasons, expanded presidential review may be more
effective than the hard look doctrine. The hard look doctrine con-
templates that to assure regulation in the public interest, courts
should require agencies to provide full explanations, examine objec-
tives and relevant factors, and consider alternatives.154 The doctrine
provides considerable discretion to courts that may not be well posi-
tioned to second-guess agencies, however.155 Additionally, the hard
look doctrine may frustrate the rulemaking process by requiring
agencies to jump through hoops that are unnecessary in some cases.156
In contrast, the president is able to examine the merits directly
through cost-benefit analysis and to eschew costly and unnecessary
procedures.
Some might argue that the president’s interest in pursuing eco-
nomic growth might be deleterious because he would tend to avoid
regulations that would depress growth, even if that meant discarding
regulations that address externalities that have long-term effects. This
danger does not seem enormously significant because, when citizens
focus on issues in elections, they seem to take into account important
public goods like national defense and the environment.157 Moreover,
other key actors in the regulatory process, such as agency heads, do
not have longer time horizons than the president. To the contrary, the
president is more concerned about long-term effects because he
wants to be reelected, have a member of his party succeed him, and
burnish his historical reputation.
153. The Congressional Review Act creates a greater barrier to impositions on the citizen by
making it easier for Congress to block regulations. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 251, 110 Stat. 857, 868 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–
808 (2000)). This Act is a congressional move toward constitutional restoration similar to the
presidential move advocated in this Essay.
154. Merrick Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 507, 529 (1985).
155. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist, 83
ADMIN. L.J. 747, 751 (1995) (noting Justice Breyer’s criticism that judges lack the information
to second-guess agencies).
156. Id. (noting Justice Breyer’s criticism that the hard look doctrine may unduly hamstring
the regulatory process).
157. Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget that Does What It Is Supposed to
Do (And No More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449, 1462 n.38 (1997) (suggesting that, because the major
political parties represent different views on public spending and public goods, citizens are able
to express their preferences about expenditures on public goods by voting).
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1. Restoring Bicameralism Through OIRA. The requirement
that a regulation receive the approval of OIRA as well as agency ap-
proval introduces, like the addition of another legislative chamber to
a previously unicameral legislature, an additional barrier to restricting
citizens’ freedom. Furthermore, like an additional legislative chamber
elected from different jurisdictions, OIRA impedes interest group
legislation to some extent. Even assuming that the same interest
groups were as capable of influencing OIRA as administrative agen-
cies, the additional layer of review makes it harder for these interest
groups to gain rents through regulation just as bicameralism makes it
harder for interest groups to gain rent through legislation.
The implicit theory behind bicameralism is that requiring two
chambers’ approval is likely to improve legislation through the filter-
ing process.158 And this theory, if true for bicameralism in the legisla-
tive process, should be true of two layers of administrative review as
well. The different interest groups likely to influence OIRA and the
regulatory agency may counterbalance one another, creating a regula-
tion more representative of the public interest than any special inter-
est. For instance, management might influence OIRA to counterbal-
ance union influence on agencies. This view of the advantages of a
two-step administrative process reflects the more general theory of
Federalist No. 10 as well: the more freely counterbalancing factions
circulate, the more likely policies will emerge that are closer to the
public interest.159
Thus, I disagree with the notion advanced by some commenta-
tors that it is imperative for those in the OIRA process to work
smoothly with those in the agencies.160 This notion fails sufficiently to
take account of the manner in which bicameralism can be seen as an
analogue to the regulatory review process. A central advantage of
OIRA review is that it offers a distinctive process for regulatory ap-
proval that may be influenced by different interest groups at least
some of the time. Just as bicameralism is premised on the proposition
that creative tension between two different legislative chambers will
158. See supra notes 36–57 and accompanying text.
159. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 47, at 78–80 (James Madison); see DAVID A.
EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 99–107 (1984) (arguing that Madison
felt that the structure of the Union would prevent control by dueling factions).
160. See, e.g., Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 17 (“What is needed instead is a definition
of shared goals and objectives, accompanied by good and continuing working relations, clear
jurisdictional authority, and mutual investment in the basic goals of improving regulatory per-
formance according to agreed-upon criteria.”).
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lead to better laws, creative tension occurring between OIRA and a
regulatory agency should lead to regulations that are more likely to
advance the public interest.
It might be argued that if two sets of interest groups are poised to
influence regulation, the emerging regulation may be more costly be-
cause it must satisfy two sets of interest groups rather than one. This
criticism also can be made of legislative bicameralism, and the re-
sponse at the administrative level is basically the same as the response
at the legislative level. Assume that a different set of interest groups
attempts to gain rents in the Senate than seeks rents in the House of
Representatives. Although bicameralism could abstractly generate
worse legislation, the proposed Senate amendments that make the
legislation worse will create additional opposition to the legislation. It
is not true that legislation can provide limitless rents or we would ob-
serve even more rent-seeking legislation.161 Rents are granted until
the point at which the marginal political cost outweighs the benefit of
granting any more rents. A premise of bicameralism is that, because
an interest group generally would have bumped up against the mar-
ginal ceiling where additional rents will be politically costly in one
chamber, additional interest group activity in the other chamber is
more likely to have a counterbalancing effect. The same dynamic
should be at work in OIRA. If the interest groups already have come
close to exhausting the rent-seeking potential of a particular regula-
tion, it will be hard to add more rents without triggering more sub-
stantial opposition.
Moreover, the influential factions at OIRA are likely to be less
egregiously rent seeking than the narrow industry- and labor-oriented
factions that will influence the administrative agencies.162 First, they
are likely to be filtered through political parties because OIRA is
closer to the White House, which is traditionally influenced by politi-
cal parties. Once filtered through a political party, factions tend to
161. Cf. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 134, at 503–04 (suggesting that legislators can-
not simply circumvent supermajority rules applied to tax increases with debt because of limits
on rent seeking).
162. One might argue that one advantage of a process without OIRA is that regulations
spanning the jurisdiction of several agencies are more difficult for special interests to shape be-
cause it is harder for a particular faction to capture multiple agencies than one agency. But even
with OIRA, such regulations still will have to receive the approval of multiple agencies. OIRA
does not replace the agency process but supplements it.
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become more broad-based163—what Mancur Olson would call a more
“encompassing interest.”164 These broad-based factions are less likely
to take rents for themselves because, as they become a more encom-
passing interest, it is more likely that the resources used to pay for the
rents will be drawn from the encompassing interest itself.165 Second,
agencies outside the direct purview of the president, particularly in-
dependent agencies, tend to be more easily influenced by congres-
sional power, particularly through congressional committees, than
agencies like OIRA that are within the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent.166 Regional factions can be particularly harmful to economic
growth when they are given the power to influence regulations that
have effects outside their region.167 Because OIRA is less subject to
congressional influence, the factional influence on OIRA is likely to
be less detrimental than the influence on the regulatory agencies
themselves.168
It has been argued that OIRA is not a neutral screen because it is
more likely to block regulation or weaken it than insist on more ro-
bust regulation.169 But this asymmetry actually brings us closer to the
163. Political parties serve in fact as a counterbalance to narrow special interests. Michael A.
Fitts, The Vices of Virtues: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legisla-
tive Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1604 (1988); see also Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Di-
versity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Fi-
nancial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1320 (1991) (explaining that diversity in state laws
ensures that special interests do not prevail on the national level).
164. MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND
CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 14 (2000).
165. Id. at 14–17. For instance, a coalition made up of all productive industries is less likely
to take rents than a coalition of the auto industry, because the auto industry can hope that the
rents will be supported by taxes that other industries and their employees generate whereas the
rents for all industries must be supported by taxes from those same industries and their
stakeholders.
166. John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 1, 19 (special issue 1990) (noting that agencies must balance their relationships
with both Congress and the president). For a discussion of why committees may be unrepresen-
tative of Congress, see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
167. For a discussion of the tragedy of the commons, see supra note 120 and accompanying
text. See also Calabresi, supra note 120, at 84 (discussing the risk of “geographic” capture of
agencies).
168. As always, the important judgment in structural matters is the overall assessment com-
pared to the alternatives. Some rent-seeking factions will influence OIRA; the question is
whether they are likely to be, on balance, worse than those influencing the agencies.
169. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1512, 1552 (1992). For a discussion of such criticisms, see THOMAS O. MCGARITY,
REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL
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original design of bicameralism because a premise of bicameralism
was the absence of substantial regulation. The Framers did not need
to worry that bicameralism would block attempts to repeal burden-
some laws because, at the beginning of the Republic, the federal gov-
ernment had passed few such laws.170 In the context of the modern
administrative state, however, where there has been substantial dele-
gation already, the Federal Register already contains much special in-
terest regulation. Insofar as OIRA poses less of an additional hurdle
for deregulation than it does for regulation, the regulatory review
process actually makes the political process more similar to the Foun-
ders’ design.
2. Restoring the Presidential Veto Through OIRA. Another ef-
fect of the regulatory review process is to compensate for the loss of
the president’s veto power. The review process reduces his transac-
tion costs in monitoring agencies and thus helps him keep agency
heads within the margin of autonomy that their independent author-
ity (even in the important but limited sense that they often must be
fired to stop their exercise of authority contrary to the president’s
will) permits.171 It thus strengthens the president’s autonomy and
makes his regulatory review power similar to his power to veto bills.
It could be argued that the reduction of monitoring costs is illu-
sory because the president still has to monitor the staff of OIRA, in-
cluding the desk officers at OMB. No structure can eliminate transac-
tion costs in a hierarchy, but OIRA reduces them in two ways. First,
for reasons of culture and incentives, OIRA is closer to the presi-
dent.172 The bureaucracy, and particularly the head of OIRA, largely
will be judged a success or failure by its implementation of the presi-
dent’s program: that is its job. Second, conflicts with particular agen-
cies will provide the president and his immediate subordinates with
some information about which agency heads warrant close scrutiny.
BUREAUCRACY 281–88 (1991) (cataloging complaints made against specific executive-
controlled agencies).
170. There were many fewer laws at the time of the Framing, and the laws that had been
passed prior to the Constitution had faced supermajority rules in the Articles of Confederation.
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 9 (manuscript at 12).
171. Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith
in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 707–09 (2000) (discussing OIRA’s moni-
toring role). I discuss the argument that the president can simply supplant the discretion of his
agency heads and issue regulations himself. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
172. See Kagan, supra note 65, at 2338 (suggesting that OIRA follows the “policy orienta-
tion of the President”).
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As congressional committees provide fire alarms for Congress, telling
them of agencies that need to be monitored more closely, OIRA pro-
vides fire alarms for the president.173
Others have objected to OIRA’s micromanagement of the agen-
cies, suggesting that the president would be better off setting clear,
broad parameters and letting the agencies follow them.174 Clear poli-
cies from the president will doubtless improve implementation of his
agenda—that is one reason that Ronald Reagan was a successful
president. But applying broad policies to specific cases requires inter-
pretation because different presidential policy objectives may come
into conflict, and it is useful to have OIRA to articulate the nuances
of policies centrally. In that way, the tradeoffs among different presi-
dential goals can be refined, particularly when disputes are raised to
the president or the vice president under the current executive order.
At its best, this process has a dialectical advantage over application of
a fixed set of goals; by weighing difficult tradeoffs in different con-
texts, the OIRA review process actually will improve the articulation
of the president’s goals, making them more nuanced and transparent.
3. Advancing the Objectives of Tricameralism Through Cost-
Benefit Analysis. The final aspect of the regulatory review order that
attempts constitutional restoration is the substantive requirement of
cost-benefit analysis. The original constitutional filters of bicameral-
ism and presentment offered the promise of distinguishing public
goods from special interest legislation overall.175 The cost-benefit
analysis accomplishes much the same objective, at least if the baseline
for regulation is the absence of government intervention, because
cost-benefit analysis should authorize government intervention only if
its net benefits are greater than those provided by the market or
nonmarket forms of spontaneous order like the family. Such interven-
tion produces public goods—services that the market or the family ei-
ther cannot provide or cannot provide as efficiently.176
173. For a discussion of the fire-alarm systems in Congress, see Mathew McCubbins et al.,
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 250
(1987).
174. Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-
Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 43–44 (1994).
175. See supra notes 43–57 and accompanying text.
176. Cost-benefit analysis attempts to mimic the market in measuring the value of regula-
tion “in terms of willingness to pay.” Cass R. Sunstein, Is Cost Benefit Analysis for Everyone?,
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 299, 301 (2001). Cost-benefit analysis takes entitlements as they are and
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Cost-benefit analysis tries to provide a process that can substitute
for the filtering provided by the original Constitution to assure that
government action serves the public good rather than special inter-
ests.177 Thus cost-benefit analysis revives tricameralism in a manner
fundamentally different from the manner in which other provisions of
the regulatory review order revive tricameralism. First, cost-benefit
analysis is substantive while the other provisions of the regulatory re-
view order impose procedural constraints by adding another layer of
review through OIRA. Second, cost-benefit analysis directly aims at
the goal of tricameralism—assuring that government action is in the
public interest—rather than replicating its structure. Because of these
features, cost-benefit analysis is perhaps a more radical form of con-
stitutional restoration. It may be justified nonetheless because the
other provisions of the regulatory review order cannot fully restore
tricameralism. After all, getting a bill through both the mutually jeal-
ous Senate and House of Representatives is harder than getting a
regulation through a substantive agency and OIRA. Moreover, be-
cause the power of special interests has grown since the founding of
does not seek to change them. But this is a sound limitation as a matter of political economy.
Redistribution, if to be undertaken at all, is best done through the tax system, not through
regulations. See infra notes 240–42 and accompanying text. Regulation as a general matter
should be a matter of allocation. Of course, the president is bound to use regulation for redis-
tributive purposes if Congress so directs. The issue in the regulatory review order is how the
president should exercise his discretion in the absence of congressional direction to the contrary.
177. While the Constitution does not mandate cost-benefit analysis, such a mode of thinking
was not unknown to the Framers. Benjamin Franklin recommended that individuals consider
courses of action by writing down all their advantages and disadvantages:
To get over this, my Way is, to divide half a Sheet of Paper by a Line into two Col-
umns; writing over the one Pro, and over the other Con. Then during three or four
Days Consideration, I put down under the different heads short Hints of the different
Motives, that at different Times occur to me, for or against the Measure. When I have
thus got them all together in one View, I endeavour to estimate their respective
Weights; and where I find two, one on each side, that seem equal, I strike them both
out. If I find a Reason pro equal to some two Reasons con, I strike out the three. If I
judge some two Reasons con, equal to some three Reasons pro, I strike out the five;
and thus proceeding I find at length where the Ballance lies; and if after a Day or two
of farther Consideration, nothing new that is of Importance occurs on either side, I
come to a Determination accordingly. And, tho’ the Weight of Reasons cannot be
taken with the Precision of Algebraic Quantities, yet, when each is thus considered,
separately and comparatively, and the whole lies before me, I think I can judge bet-
ter, and am less liable to make a rash Step; and in fact I have found great Advantage
from this kind of Equation, in what may be called Moral or Prudential Algebra.
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS, WITH INTRODUCTION, BIBLIOGRAPHY
AND NOTES 348–49 (Frank Luther Mott & Chester E. Jorgenson eds., 1936); see also Int’l Un-
ion, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1319–21 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (suggesting that there exists a con-
tinuity between Benjamin Franklin’s thought and cost-benefit analysis). I am grateful to Jona-
than Weiner for bringing this quotation to my attention.
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the Republic,178 it may well be that the government needs even
stronger restraints against special interest–inspired impositions than it
did then.
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to respond to the many ob-
jections to cost-benefit analysis. I agree with Professors Matthew
Adler and Eric Posner that cost-benefit analysis ultimately can be de-
fended (as against other global measures on the efficacy of agency
regulation) on the grounds that it is a more feasible metric to apply
than others that have been proposed.179 From my analysis of the pur-
pose of the regulatory review order, one other point emerges for this
institutional defense. If one of the principal purposes of the regula-
tory review process is to block special interest regulation, cost-benefit
analysis performs a useful function. Special interests want to hide the
costs of their regulations and exaggerate the benefits because that
makes it harder for political entrepreneurs to rally the diffuse citi-
zenry to oppose these regulations.180 By imposing a single, relatively
straightforward symmetric metric on regulations, cost-benefit analysis
makes it harder for interest groups to hide costs and exaggerate bene-
fits.181 Many of the other metrics, such as multidimensional assess-
178. For a discussion of the reasons special interests have grown stronger, see McGinnis &
Rappaport, supra note 26, at 394–96. In particular, we note that special interests have multiplied
as labor has become more specialized. Id. at 394.
179. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J.
165, 225–26 (1999) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis offers a more workable model than alter-
natives).
180. See Phillip Nelson, Political Information, 19 J.L. & ECON. 315, 323 (1976) (suggesting
that rent seekers who lack a political majority have an incentive to take their gain “in a form
where the issue can be easily obscured”). Indeed, information costs drive modern interest group
politics, in which political success not only depends on satisfying members of a politician’s coali-
tion but also on disarming potential opposition. Other ways of facilitating the acquisition of
rents include using obscure regulations or legislation. See Zelinsky, supra note 121, at 1374–75
(arguing that “[u]nfunded mandates . . . present legislators with the political temptation to levy
hidden municipal taxes” because constituents do not appreciate the link between their munici-
pal tax bills and their legislators’ adoption of unfunded mandates); see also John O. McGinnis,
The Bar Against Challenges to Employment Consent Decrees: A Public Choice Perspective, 54
LA. L. REV. 1507, 1530–31 (1994) (discussing the collateral attack bar in employment discrimi-
nation as an example of legislation that raises the information costs of potential opposition).
181. Cost-benefit analysis has been defended persuasively as a pragmatic tool. Richard Pos-
ner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J.
LEG. STUD. 1153, 1157 (2000) (endorsing a pragmatic defense of cost-benefit analysis); Cass
Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 1059, 1077 (2000) (Cost-benefit
analysis is “best taken as [a] pragmatic instrument . . . designed to assist people in making com-
plex judgments where multiple goods are involved.”). What I try to add is that cost-benefit
analysis—particularly through the transparency and discipline it provides—restrains rent seek-
ing and thus restores one of the original functions of the Constitution.
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ment, are far more complicated and opaque and they would thus per-
form this function less effectively.
Direct consideration of costs and benefits by the subordinates of
an elected official has some distinctive virtues and vices compared to
other structures designed to assure that the federal government pro-
duces only public goods. It is useful to compare cost-benefit analysis
with a legislative structure that relies on the procedural screens of bi-
cameralism and the veto power to filter out special interest laws and
with a judicial process for the invalidation of special interest legisla-
tion of the sort Richard Epstein recommends in his book Takings.182
Cost-benefit analysis has some advantages over these structures.
Compared to the legislature, the president can more easily employ
experts because of the hierarchical nature of the executive branch.183
These experts, in turn, can provide input that lay analysis could not
replicate, yet their contributions ultimately would be assessed in po-
litical terms because of the president’s politically accountable role. In
contrast to a judicial scheme, cost-benefit analysis places responsibil-
ity in a more politically accountable individual. As a result, cost-
benefit analysis can be carried out in a manner that will be more sen-
sitive to political concerns, and it may be ultimately less susceptible to
attack and less politically fragile.
To be sure, presidential calculation of costs and benefits has
some disadvantages as well. As compared to the legislature, the ex-
ecutive branch is a more centralized decisionmaker. Like all central-
ized decisionmakers, the president and his subordinates will have dif-
ficulty assigning the correct costs and benefits.184 In contrast, the
process of bicameralism is somewhat less centralized because it ob-
tains information about costs and benefits from representatives
throughout the country.185 Moreover, compared to decisions made
182. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 29–31 (1985) (defending judicial activism as a means to ensure that individual rights
are not destroyed).
183. For this reason, the practice of delegation grew hand in hand with the acceptance of the
“expertise model” of administration. Philip J. Harter, The Political Legitimacy and Judicial Re-
view of Consensual Rules, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 471, 472 (1983) (linking the rise in delegation to
the executive branch with the rise of the expertise model).
184. See Roger Clegg, Epilogue: Civil Rights in the Eighties and Nineties, 54 LA. L. REV.
1605, 1612 (1994) (discussing the difficulties that centralized bureaucracies face in economic de-
cisionmaking).
185. Rent seekers in fact provide a service by bringing information to the attention of legis-
lators. See Dwight R. Lee, In Defense of Excessive Government, 65 S. ECON. J. 674, 680–84, 688–
90 (1999) (arguing that certain government programs that seem wasteful may truly serve the
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with the insulation of life tenure, cost-benefit analyses executed by a
politically accountable agency close to the president are prone to be
distorted by political passions in politically sensitive cases.186
For instance, it can be argued that the president will not faith-
fully carry out serious cost-benefit analyses because he will under-
estimate the costs when these costs fall on factions that do not sup-
port him and overestimate the benefits when they accrue to factions
that support him. In this sense, the fear would be that cost-benefit
analysis would simply serve as a cover for rent seeking for a different
set of factions rather than that those factions would dominate a pro-
cess in which agencies made the final decision.187
There are two responses to this concern. The first is that cost-
benefit analysis will discipline some of these political tendencies,
which would occur even in the absence of cost-benefit analysis. At
least the requirement of the calculus provides a useful framework for
comparison.188 Individuals and groups can cite to inconsistencies, if
these crop up, and, by applying the same standard across agencies,
critics can make interagency comparisons. Second, because of the
president’s interest in long-term growth, he is likely to be a more
faithful arbiter of cost-benefit analysis than other government offi-
cials. The defense of cost-benefit analysis undertaken by the presi-
dent, like all defenses of institutional arrangements, is not that it is
perfect but that it is better than the alternatives.
Nevertheless, even if no single aspect of the president’s executive
order on regulatory review compensates for the loss of tricameralism
occasioned by delegation, both the procedural and substantive as-
pects of the regulatory review order move us back toward the Fram-
ers’ system designed to filter public good provisions from special in-
terest impositions.
public interest). Nevertheless, interest groups and constituents will bring concerns to OIRA di-
rectly.
186. I previously noted that such passions and interests also could adversely affect the integ-
rity of federalism decisions under the federalism executive order. See supra notes 140–42 and
accompanying text.
187. Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Solution to a Principal-Agent Problem, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 289, 294 (2001) (“Indeed the hard-headed public choice theorist would conjec-
ture that the President is more likely to enforce cost-benefit requirements on agencies that do
not generally transfer resources to his constituents, and adopt a lax attitude toward agencies
that do.”).
188. See supra note 181 (collecting authorities describing the analytical discipline that is im-
posed by cost-benefit analysis).
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IV.  RECOMMENDED REVISIONS OF THE FEDERALISM AND
REGULATORY REVIEW EXECUTIVE ORDERS
A. Revising the Federalism Executive Order
The normative analysis sketched above leads to the following
recommendations for revising the federalism executive order:
1. Strengthening Competitive Federalism. The original Constitu-
tion recognized that there were costs to centralized regulation and
circumscribed the government’s regulatory powers. The federalism
order should be amended to strengthen competitive federalism. It
should specifically allude to the original design and suggest that fed-
eral regulation is warranted, unless otherwise required by law, only
when the presence of interstate externalities or spillovers suggests
that federal regulation is necessary. In other words, the existence of
substantial externalities should be a prerequisite to going forward
with the cost-benefit analysis at all.189 The order should specifically
note that when an activity within individual states creates no substan-
tial spillovers into neighboring states, and when there is no pressing
need for national harmonization of standards, regulatory competition
among these states is not in itself an externality but a desirable aspect
of federalism.190 Even when there needs to be some federal involve-
ment, the order should direct OIRA to consider whether there re-
mains a role for state regulatory competition within an overall federal
framework.
2. Applying Federalism Principles to Agency Recommendations
About Legislation. One important limitation on the degree of consti-
tutional restoration that the federalism order affords is that its appli-
cation is limited to the executive branch. Congress can pass statutes
that do not comply with the federalism principles that limit the role of
the federal government to solving social problems with substantial ex-
ternalities. One partial response to this difficulty is to direct agencies
to follow the principles of the federalism order in their recommenda-
tions as to whether the president should sign such legislation.
189. As discussed above, when the interstate externalities caused by private activity are in-
substantial, it is likely that the federal regulatory process will give rise to more substantial costs.
For a general discussion of this danger, see BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 34, at 283–95.
190. When jurisdictional competition is working well, optimal national harmonization may
occur as a byproduct. See supra note 140.
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3. Revising the Preemption Section of the Federalism Order. Ex-
ecutive Order 13,132 imposes a clear statement rule on agencies in
preemption matters. Section 4 of the order essentially directs the
agency to interpret a statute as requiring preemption only when Con-
gress expressly or clearly intends to preempt state laws and to inter-
pret it as permitting preemption only when that delegation is clearly
expressed or intended.191 The standard for preemption in the Clinton
order is not very different from that in Reagan’s original order, al-
though the Reagan order had a slightly stronger standard for preemp-
tion.192 The breadth of the clear statement rule should be slightly nar-
rowed to those areas in which preemption would undercut
jurisdictional competition, because such a scope would better com-
port with a view of the federalism order as constitutional restoration
and because it would be easier to defend as a matter of law.193
191. Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 4(a)–(b), 3 C.F.R. 206, 208 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2000):
(a) Agencies shall construe, in regulations and otherwise, a Federal statute to pre-
empt State law only where the statute contains an express preemption provision or
there is some other clear evidence that the Congress intended preemption of State
law, or where the exercise of State authority conflicts with the exercise of Federal
authority under the Federal statute.
(b) Where a Federal statute does not preempt State law (as addressed in subsection
(a) of this section), agencies shall construe any authorization in the statute for the is-
suance of regulations as authorizing preemption of State law by rulemaking only
when the exercise of State authority directly conflicts with the exercise of Federal
authority under the Federal statute or there is clear evidence to conclude that the
Congress intended the agency to have the authority to preempt State law.
192. Blake, supra note 97, at 311 (describing the slightly more stringent standard of the
Reagan order). The Reagan order, Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987), revoked by
Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000), provided:
(a) To the extent permitted by law, Executive departments and agencies shall con-
strue, in regulations and otherwise, a Federal statute to preempt State law only when
the statute contains an express preemption provision or there is some other firm and
palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the Congress intended preemption
of State law, or when the exercise of State authority conflicts with the exercise of
Federal authority under the Federal statute.
(b) Where a Federal statute does not preempt State law (as addressed in subsection
(a) of this section), Executive departments and agencies shall construe any authoriza-
tion in the statute for the issuance of regulations as authorizing preemption of State
law by rule-making only when the statute expressly authorizes issuance of preemptive
regulations or there is some other firm and palpable evidence compelling the conclu-
sion that the Congress intended to delegate to the department or agency the authority
to issue regulations preempting State law.
Exec. Order No. 12,612 § 4(a)–(b), 3 C.F.R. at 255.
193. For instance, it may be that state statutes that restrict advertising retard the process of
jurisdictional competition by preventing information from circulating and thus can be pre-
empted. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the Federal Trade Commission,
1976 DUKE L.J. 225, 247 (advocating FTC preemption of statutes that precluded pharmaceutical
advertising).
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To be sure, the Reagan administration consciously rooted its
clear statement rule in the need for a constitutional restoration in the
area of preemption.194 Forms of preemption other than express pre-
emption were thought to make it harder for the states to protect their
interests in the political process, undermining the procedural protec-
tions of federalism. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,195 the Court emphasized the importance of the protection
that the constitutional legislative process affords to state interests.196
Although Garcia is generally regarded as a case unsympathetic to
federalism (because it limited the judicial enforceability of the Tenth
Amendment), its reasoning could be seen to provide support for
cabining preemption to cases where Congress has expressly displaced
state law.197 Regardless of the validity of its refusal to enforce a sphere
of sovereign state autonomy through judicial action, Garcia reiterated
that one of the most important bulwarks of federalism is the constitu-
tional structure of the legislative process.198 Under this view, the diffi-
culty with forms of preemption other than express preemption is that
they deprive the states of the full benefits of this protection by per-
mitting state laws to be preempted indirectly by the inferences and
constructions of an unelected federal judiciary rather than directly by
the votes of legislators elected from the several states.199 In other
194. For the reasoning behind this analysis of preemption, see, for example, THE STATUS OF
FEDERALISM IN AMERICA: A REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FEDERALISM OF THE
DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL 37–42 (1986).
195. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
196. Id. at 554. In Garcia, the Court refused to invalidate on Tenth Amendment grounds
congressional legislation imposing minimum wage requirements on state transit operations. Id.
The Court’s core holding was that Congress’s power to impose its will on the states should be
limited, not by ad hoc judicial determinations balancing state and federal interests under the
Tenth Amendment, but by the structural arrangements of the federal system, principally the
state’s participation in the national political process through the voice of its elected representa-
tives. Id.
197. The importance of these protections, at least in areas of traditional state autonomy, is
one way to understand Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), in which the Court refused to
apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to state court judges because its ap-
plication was not clearly indicated. Id. at 470; see also Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406,
413–14 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing Garcia to justify the court’s refusal to enforce SEC regulations
that intruded into traditional state areas without a clear indication of congressional intent).
198. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551–54.
199. Clark, supra note 150, at 1429. Federal judges have life tenure, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1,
and thus by constitutional design are not politically accountable in their states. Thus, under the
Constitution’s structure, there is no substantial political constraint to prevent the federal judici-
ary from encroaching on state interests. The only constraint is the method of judicial decision-
making—the constraint of formal rules neutrally applied. Insofar as federal judges instead em-
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words, when “obstacle” or “occupation of the field” preemption is
permitted to displace state law, state autonomy depends not upon the
deliberate and clearly enunciated political judgment of those elected
from the states but upon the ad hoc determinations of federal
judges.200
Fidelity to the separation of powers was also thought to weigh in
favor of narrowing the preemption doctrine to favor a clear statement
rule because it would force Congress to take responsibility for the
hard choice to displace state law rather than sloughing this responsi-
bility off on the courts.201
Finally, an elastic preemption doctrine was thought inconsistent
with yet another strand of the separation of powers because it en-
courages the judiciary to overstep its constitutional bounds.202 Because
of the amorphous nature of the tests employed by the courts, “obsta-
cle” and “occupation of the field” preemption tend to entangle the
judiciary in an evaluation of the competing policy merits of a solely
federal regime and a federal regime supplemented by state law.203
ploy discretionary methods of decision that resemble those of legislators, the Constitution’s
structure suggests that state interests would be better protected by the political branches.
200. The Reagan administration also found support for this aspect of Garcia’s teaching in
Gregory v. Ashcroft, in which the Court refused to permit federal age discrimination law to pre-
empt Missouri’s mandatory retirement age for its state judges. 501 U.S. at 473. Indeed, in that
case, the Court stated that it would require a clear statement from Congress before it would in-
terpret a provision of the law to apply to state judges. Id. at 464. While the Court has not ap-
plied the clear statement rule to all preemption cases, the more clearly states are put on notice
that their rights of governance are to be displaced by federal law, the more effectively the legis-
lative process will protect state autonomy.
201. It is now widely recognized that Congress delegates power to other entities at least in
part to avoid accountability for hard decisions. The question of whether to preempt state law is
frequently a peculiarly difficult decision: Congress may be besieged not only by the usual pri-
vate interest groups who would like centralized regulation but also by elected state officials and
state government institutions whose power may be diminished by preemption. The incentives to
punt on the preemption issue thus may often be intense. See Clark, supra note 150, at 1427 (“To
the extent that proposed legislation (later claimed to regulate the states) is ambiguous, states
and their allies in the legislative process lack notice and thus incentive to prevent adoption of
[preempting] legislation. . . . A clear statement requirement prevents such evasion.”).
202. See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 685, 694 (1991) (suggesting that preemption can permit the judiciary to make policy deci-
sions and usurp the legislature’s role).
203. A doctrinal structure that leads to such a policy-laden role for courts was not thought to
comport with the judicial role contemplated under Article III. The decision to locate responsi-
bility for assuring the supremacy of federal law in the federal judiciary rather than in the legisla-
ture or in the executive was made by a founding generation well aware that the salient charac-
teristic of the judiciary was that it has, in Hamilton’s famous words, no “will, but merely
judgment.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
When the judiciary weighs the policy merits (or even measures its view of the extent of the fed-
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Despite the power of these arguments, the jurisprudential justifi-
cation for the clear statement rule has been challenged in two careful
recent articles on preemption. Professor Caleb Nelson suggests that
the language in the Supremacy Clause that directs courts to enforce
federal law “anything to the contrary notwithstanding” precludes a
presumption against preemption, let alone a clear statement ap-
proach.204 Nelson asserts that the Supremacy Clause’s language was
well understood as a “non obstante” clause at the time of the Framing
and that such clauses were expressly intended to override the tradi-
tional presumption that later statutes should not be read to contradict
prior statutes.205 In the case of the Supremacy Clause, it was intended
to reject a general presumption that federal law does not contradict
prior state law.206 Therefore, even conceding that the political process
provides protection for state autonomy, the protection should not
generate special canons of statutory interpretation to cut back on
preemption.207
Professor Viet Dinh also suggests that a clear statement require-
ment or even a general presumption against preemption would be
anomalous given the other ways in which federal law displaces state
law.208 For instance, Professor Dinh notes that under the dormant
Commerce Clause or federal common law, state law can be ousted
even without clear congressional action.209 He argues that federal in-
terstitial lawmaking cannot be squared with the clear statement
rule,210 and thus it would not be consistent to apply the presumption
only to preemption.211
Whatever the resolution of this jurisprudential debate on the
proper scope of judicial preemption standards, the conception of con-
stitutional restoration advanced in this Essay provides policy reasons
eral interest versus that of the state) in determining the scope of preemption, it is exercising will
rather than judgment and consequently its action cannot be distinguished from that of the leg-
islature.
204. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 292–96 (2000).
205. Id. 241–43.
206. Id. at 293.
207. Id. at 302.
208. Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2097–2100 (2000).
209. Id. at 2099.
210. Id. at 2098.
211. Professor Bradford Clark criticizes Professor Dinh’s analysis, suggesting that “constitu-
tional structure appears to favor a presumption against preemption because the Constitution
gives states a role in selecting Congress and the President, but not federal courts.” Clark, supra
note 150, at 1429.
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for the president to direct his agencies to follow a clear statement rule
within the scope of their statutory discretion.212 Recall that this Essay
contends that the federalism order is necessary to restore the jurisdic-
tional competition that has been eroded by Congress’s use of plenary
powers. Accordingly, at least when Congress is not addressing some
interjurisdictional spillover or strengthening the conditions for inter-
jurisdictional competition (such as permitting free movement of peo-
ple and capital), there are policy reasons for the executive to employ
its administrative discretion against interpreting a statute to require
preemption or to delegate authority for preemption to the agency. It
would follow from this rationale that in those few instances when
Congress is addressing spillovers or protecting the free flow of capital
among the states, the presumption against preemption should not ap-
ply because the model of jurisdictional competition assigns these re-
sponsibilities to the federal government.213 As with other issues in fed-
eralism, the executive has an advantage over the judiciary in creating
a pragmatic doctrine of preemption that actually advances the general
values of efficient constitutional design.214
Moreover, this policy rationale for a clear statement rule would
provide a firmer legal basis for the federalism order’s authority to cut
back on agency preemption when agencies are exercising discretion.
There is a debate in the literature about whether the policy decision-
making that an agency can exercise within the scope of its statutory
discretion under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Defense Resource
Council, Inc. permits the agency to disregard judicial canons of con-
212. It is clear that the Court believes that at least issues of statutory meaning that result in
preemption are subject to the principle announced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517
U.S. 735, 743–44 (1996) (stating that questions of a statute’s substantive meaning were subject to
Chevron, where the question was whether interpretation of “interest charges” that preempted
state law would include late payments). The Court has not decided whether interpretations of
jurisdictional provisions (like the scope of express preemption provisions) are subject to Chev-
ron deference. See id. at 744 (assuming without deciding that interpretations of preemption pro-
visions are not subject to Chevron deference). If the Court ultimately determines that such pro-
visions are not subject to deference, this preemption aspect of the federalism order will be less
important.
213. The one exception to this analysis may be that even in the area of spillovers, the “ob-
stacle” rationale for preemption should not be permitted. Professor Nelson shows that obstacle
preemption is inconsistent with the original understanding. “The mere fact that Congress enacts
a statute to serve certain purposes does not automatically imply that Congress wants to displace
all state law that will get in the way of those purposes.” Nelson, supra note 204, at 287.
214. For a discussion of the virtues of pragmatic federalism in other areas of the federalism
executive order, see supra notes 136–40 and accompanying text.
MCGINNIS.DOC 02/05/02 10:35 AM
950 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:901
struction.215 The Supreme Court has not consistently adopted a clear
statement rule for preemption.216 Therefore it could be argued that if
the president directed the agencies to adhere to the clear statement
rule, he would be adding a canon of construction based on jurispru-
dential views contrary to the Court.217
In contrast, if the president based his presumption on his view of
jurisdictional competition, he would be injecting the kind of policy
consideration with which Chevron undoubtedly permits agencies
(and, by extension, the president as their supervisor) to guide policy
decisions within statutorily granted discretion.218 Case precedent also
suggests that the executive branch should be able to disregard canons
of interpretation that simply reflect policy considerations when those
canons do not reflect the agency’s policy calculus.219 As discussed
above, preemption cases that are not based on clear congressional in-
tent necessarily require the judiciary to conduct a policy balance be-
tween the relative weight of state and federal interests.220 When a po-
litically accountable agency is available, Chevron suggests that this
policy calculus should be made by the agency.221 There is no reason
that the president cannot direct the exercise of this discretion on
215. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649,
675–79 (2000) (suggesting that agencies should be able to disregard canons based on policy con-
siderations but not based on jurisprudential considerations). But see Thomas W. Merrill, Judi-
cial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 988 (1992) (“[I]f an agency interpreta-
tion is consistent with the language and purpose of a statute, it is hard to see how it could be
condemned as unreasonable simply because a judicial canon would suggest a contrary result.”).
216. See McGinnis, supra note 142 (manuscript at 29–32) (criticizing recent cases for not
adopting a clear statement rule).
217. Basing an interpretation on jurisprudential considerations exacerbates the tension be-
tween Chevron and the command of the Administrative Procedure Act for the reviewing Court
to “decide all relevant questions of law.” See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in
Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 193–95 (1998) (describing this tension).
218. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Inter-
pretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 625 (1996) (arguing that Chevron is based
on the presumption that “interpretive choice entails the exercise of substantial policymaking
discretion”).
219. Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1292–97 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (refusing to limit Chevron deference based on a canon construing exceptions to antitrust
statutes narrowly because the Attorney General’s interpretation was based on a policy balance),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989).
220. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
221. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
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cross-cutting policy considerations such as the promotion of jurisdic-
tional competition.222
4. Judicial Review of Executive Orders. An issue common to both
the regulatory review and federalism executive orders is whether ju-
dicial review should be available to litigate compliance with the or-
ders. Currently both orders flatly bar judicial review.223 But if the or-
ders are seen as a means of constitutional restoration, it is not clear
that judicial review should be barred, at least for procedural matters.
For instance, the Supreme Court surely would hold null and void the
attempt to enforce a law that was not passed by the Senate. If the
OIRA process is seen as a substitute for bicameralism and present-
ment, why should the courts be unable to assure compliance with the
modern substitute? Similarly, if federalism review is a substitute for
the original structure of enumerated powers within the Constitution,
it is important enough for the courts to make sure that agencies have
jumped through the appropriate procedural hoops. Moreover, per-
mitting judicial review will make it more likely that agencies will
scrupulously comply with the procedures set out in these orders.
Strong countervailing considerations, however, suggest that the
substantive provisions of the orders, such as cost-benefit analysis and
the review of whether sufficient spillovers exist to justify national
regulation, should not be subject to judicial review. These provisions
involve policy determinations and the weighing of economic costs and
benefits—areas in which the executive has a comparative advantage
over the judiciary. Moreover, involvement in these matters might
force the judiciary into policy and political thickets that might under-
mine its reputation for neutrality.
222. See Kagan, supra note 65, at 2376 (offering a justification for Chevron deference to pre-
sidentially directed statutory construction). The Court, however, may have cut back significantly
on the scope of Chevron in general. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S. Ct.
2164, 2171 (2001) (holding that Chevron deference is available when “it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,” as by giv-
ing the agency notice and comment rulemaking authority, and when “the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”).
223. Exec. Order No. 12,612 § 8, 3 C.F.R. 252, 256 (1987), revoked by Exec. Order No.
13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000); Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 11, 3
C.F.R. 206, 211 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
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B. Revising the Regulatory Review Order
From this normative analysis emerge some recommendations to
strengthen the regulatory review executive order as well:
1. Expanding the Scope. First, a revised regulatory review order
should reject the decision to restrict the full application of the order
to only major rules.224 Just as bicameralism and presentment apply to
all proposed laws, so should the OIRA process apply to all regula-
tions. The reasons for a blanket requirement in the regulatory review
process are similar to those that underlie the breadth of the require-
ment of bicameralism. The filtering process afforded by the regula-
tory review order should improve regulations overall, not only the set
of regulations with very substantial regulatory costs. Moreover, with-
out careful review, it is difficult to know whether even a minor regula-
tion will create a dynamic that generates further regulation in the fu-
ture.225
Professors Posner and Adler suggest that the threshold of $100
million in costs required to trigger OIRA cost-benefit analysis may be
sensible because it differentiates “between projects that are large
enough to warrant the direct costs of [cost-benefit analysis] and proj-
ects that are too small.”226 Even setting aside the dynamic of regula-
224. The Clinton order restricts OIRA review to “significant regulatory action” and it de-
fines such actions to include only rules that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect
in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition,
jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or
communities;
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or
planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan
programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s
priorities, or the principles set forth in this Executive order.
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641–42 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
225. See FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (George de
Huszar ed., Seymour Cain trans., Foundation for Economic Education 4th ed. 1995) (1964)
(“[A] law produces not only one effect, but a series of effects . . . . [T]he first alone is immediate;
it appears simultaneously with its cause; it is seen. The other effects emerge only subsequently;
they are not seen; we are fortunate if we foresee them.”). See generally Christopher M. Grengs,
Note, Making the Unseen Seen: Issues and Options in Small Business Regulatory Reform, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1957 (2001) (discussing the problem of unforeseen effects in the regulation of
small business).
226. Adler & Posner, supra note 179, at 240.
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tions that generate more regulations, it would be better to limit the
budget for cost-benefit analysis of a minor rule so that the costs of the
analysis itself meet a cost-benefit standard.227 Given the pressure ex-
erted by interest groups to issue regulations, even minor regulations
would be improved by the application of a cursory cost-benefit analy-
sis. Senator Everett Dirksen once said of small appropriations: “a bil-
lion here and a billion there and pretty soon you’re talking big
money.”228 The same can be said of minor regulations.
Second, if the president and his agency heads have somewhat ad-
verse interests, review of less substantial regulations can create bar-
gaining chips for the president. In the absence of a monitoring prob-
lem for insubstantial rules, the agency head can simply exempt them
from the calculation of how far he can depart from the president’s de-
sires and still keep his job. On the other hand, if these rules are moni-
tored by OIRA, they become part of the agency head’s internal cal-
culus and thus the overall bundle of rules should better reflect the
president’s desires. We can put this in arithmetical terms. As dis-
cussed above, an agency head cannot impose more costs on the presi-
dent than his dismissal would cause.229 If the departures from what the
president would want in less significant regulations are taken into ac-
count, the agency head’s scope for departure in more significant
regulations is reduced. Even if OIRA has scarce resources, it should
be able to decide which agency regulations to review. Some agency
heads warrant a closer watch than others.230
2. Including Independent Agencies in the Regulatory Review
Order. The regulatory review order does not include independent
agencies—agencies whose heads do not serve at the pleasure of the
227. Another advantage of applying a cost-benefit standard to cost-benefit analysis is that
such a limitation could prevent OIRA’s bureaucratic aggrandizement.
228. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 184 (Hugh Rawson & Mar-
garet Miner eds., 1986) (quoting Senator Everett Dirksen).
229. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
230. One argument against expanding the scope of regulatory review to include all regula-
tions is that agencies simply will avoid notice and comment rulemaking and substitute interpre-
tive rules. In my view, the courts should address this kind of substitution by maintaining a strict
dichotomy between the deference due regulations and that due interpretive rules. If interpretive
rules do not receive substantial deference, agencies still will have incentives to go through the
notice and comment process. See Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Some-
times They Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 6–9 (1996) (arguing for a strong distinc-
tion in terms of the deference given to interpretive rules and to rules that are subject to notice
and comment).
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president—within its full review process.231 Independent agencies’ ex-
ercise of quasi-legislative authority undermines tricameralism to an
even greater extent than the exercise of such discretion by noninde-
pendent agencies because such independence diminishes the presi-
dent’s formal authority to direct agency heads in the exercise of their
discretion and makes that authority even less comparable to his veto
power. Some scholars argue that the difference is not a purely formal
one: interest groups are better able to dominate independent agen-
cies, thus weakening presidential control.232 Therefore, if presidential
review is seen as constitutional restoration, the case for including in-
dependent agencies under all aspects of the presidential regulatory
review order is even stronger than including nonindependent agen-
cies.233 For reasons well articulated by others, I believe such an order
would be constitutional.234
3. Deleting Time Limits. Third, the decision in President
Clinton’s regulatory review order to put limits on the time OIRA can
review a prospective regulation is a mistake.235 The requirements of
bicameralism and presentment often delay lawmaking because of dis-
agreement between the chambers or because of a presidential veto.
The premise behind such potential delay is that it is better to have no
231. See Kagan, supra note 65, at 2277–88 (noting that neither Executive Order 12,291 nor
Executive Order 12,866 applied fully to independent agencies). The regulatory planning re-
quirements of Executive Order 12,866 apply to independent agencies. Exec. Order No. 12,866
§ 4(c), 3 C.F.R. 638, 642 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
232. The original case that independent agencies weakened presidential control can be
found in MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 137–39
(1955). For a more skeptical view, see generally Susan Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies
Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debate, 1988 DUKE L.J. 223 (suggesting
that other complex political forces are more important than independent or dependent status in
determining the extent of presidential control). For a modern discussion of agency independ-
ence, see Calabresi, supra note 120, at 83–84 (suggesting that geographically based factions and
faction members dominate independent agencies).
233. The Clinton regulatory review order already has moved in this direction by applying
the regulatory planning process of OMB to independent agencies in a way that allowed the vice
president and other participants in the interagency process to request further consideration of
rules that conflicted with the president’s program. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 2(b)–(c), 3
C.F.R. at 640 (stipulating the review roles of the OMB and the vice president in the regulatory
planning process). For further discussion of the manner in which President Clinton drew the
independent agencies closer to the executive branch, see Kagan, supra note 65, at 2288.
234. See, e.g., PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD M. BRUFF, LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 355
(1988) (arguing that the presidential authority to issue executive orders is constitutionally de-
rived from Article II, § 3).
235. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 647 (setting a strict time limit of
ninety days for OIRA review and prescribing one possible extension of thirty days).
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law than law without a consensus sufficient to assure that it is in the
public interest. Therefore, the requirements of bicameralism and pre-
sentment continue to be applied despite the passage of time without a
law being enacted.
To compensate for the loss of bicameralism and presentment, the
regulatory review process should similarly not be terminated on an
arbitrary date, because the advantages of filtering will be decreased
by the agencies’ ability to wait out the regulatory review process. It is
true that, in an impasse, the agency or OIRA can ask for a determina-
tion of the president or, at the president’s direction, a determination
of the vice president, thus giving OIRA a way of addressing delaying
tactics by agencies.236 But it may well be that a decision is not ripe for
review by the president (or the vice president) within the ninety-day
period, or the president may have other more pressing tasks to which
he must attend (including other rules to review).
To be sure, Congress can set a deadline for regulation that the
administration must respect.237 In that event, however, Congress has
managed to get a specific timing directive approved through bicamer-
alism and presentment and the deadline will have survived the tri-
cameral procedure established by the Constitution. Consequently,
there is less need for a regulatory process to substitute for the absence
of tricameralism.
4. Revising Cost-Benefit Analysis. The regulatory review pro-
cess should be more explicit about cost-benefit analysis. The Consti-
tution established a structure for the production of public goods that
the family and the market cannot provide. This view of the Constitu-
tion necessarily means that government should not regulate when the
236. See id. § 7, 3 C.F.R. at 648:
To the extent permitted by law, disagreements or conflicts between or among agency
heads or between OMB and any agency that cannot be resolved by the Administrator
of OIRA shall be resolved by the President, or by the Vice President acting at the re-
quest of the President, with the relevant agency head (and, as appropriate, other in-
terested government officials). Vice Presidential and Presidential consideration of
such disagreements may be initiated only by the Director, by the head of the issuing
agency, or by the head of an agency that has a significant interest in the regulatory ac-
tion at issue. Such review will not be undertaken at the request of other persons, enti-
ties, or their agents.
237. Congress did this with the Environmental Protection Agency in the 1980s when it felt
that the agency was not issuing regulations fast enough. Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L.
Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988
DUKE L.J. 819, 827. Of course, there are disadvantages to statutorily set regulatory deadlines.
Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 481, 509 (1987).
However, it is up to Congress to make those tradeoffs.
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market is superior. The regulatory review order should be more ex-
plicit about this value of cost-benefit analysis.
Moreover, compared to President Reagan’s order, President
Clinton’s regulatory review order is not quite as clear that the cost-
benefit analysis should be its sole focus.238 This blurring should be
cured in a revision. President Clinton’s order is not wrong in taking
into account soft as well as hard costs, but to be effectively balanced
even soft costs should be given as accurate an approximation as pos-
sible. An agency must make choices and must tote up benefits and
costs as best it can, and a single scale would facilitate this process.
Moreover, a single scale is likely to restrain interest groups more ef-
fectively because they cannot hide the costs of regulations as easily.239
A clearer focus also will make it easier to compare OIRA’s actions
across regulations, preventing the president from using differing stan-
dards to reward his own factions.
In particular, President Clinton’s order’s focus on the distributive
impacts and equity of regulations,240 if by that it means their redis-
tributive possibilities, is wrongheaded. Insofar as a nation wants to
engage in redistribution, the tax system is almost always a more effi-
cient method than regulation. As Professors Steven Shavell and Louis
Kaplow demonstrate, an inefficient regulation that redistributes
money always can be replaced by an efficient regulation and a change
in taxes that delivers the same amount of redistribution.241 The latter
combination will be pareto-optimal because the inefficient regulation
makes the same distortion in the tradeoff between labor and leisure
as the taxes and adds its own inefficiencies as well.242 Regulation for
redistribution is rarely, if ever, a public good, and this avenue for spe-
238. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 639:
In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits
of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating. Costs
and benefits shall be understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest
extent that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and
benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider. Further,
in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those
approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental,
public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), un-
less a statute requires another regulatory approach.
239. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
240. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1, 3 C.F.R. at 638.
241. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the In-
come Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 (1994).
242. Id. at 677.
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cial interest rent seeking should be blocked when the president has
the discretion under statute to block it.
A revised order also should make clear that regulation should
consider the costs that regulations themselves bring about.243 Cost-
benefit analysis should employ a dynamic scoring of costs that takes
account of the more substantial opportunities for rent seeking that re-
sult from centralized regulation. There will be cases in which, on a
first-order analysis, regulations may be useful to prevent an external-
ity such as pollution. Nevertheless, the regulation itself may cause
more externalities than it cures. For instance, it may generate a future
opportunity for one company or industry to use the regulatory regime
that is created to raise the costs borne by its competitors.244 These
public choice problems should be highlighted by the new regulatory
review order because they represent some of the costs that the high
hurdles of tricameralism in the original Constitution avoided.
5. Revising Disclosure Requirements. The revised order should
retain the requirements (initiated in President Clinton’s regulatory
review order) that OIRA disclose contacts from parties outside the
administration about the regulation.245 This disclosure rule helps re-
strain special interests, thus making the order a more effective substi-
tute for other constitutional structures that have been dissolved. As
discussed here, interest groups want to raise the information costs of
their opponents.246 One way of doing so, among others, is to keep se-
cret the nature of contacts and arguments for their regulatory rents. If
these are disclosed, it is easier for political entrepreneurs to mobilize
the diffuse citizenry to oppose rent seeking. Although special inter-
ests provide social benefits insofar as they bring information to the at-
tention of the agency that might not otherwise be gathered,247 a disclo-
sure requirement will not substantially decrease the information that
243. One must always compare the additional political externalities created by a regulatory
regime with the reduction in externalities it effectuates. John O. McGinnis, The Political Econ-
omy of Global Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 381, 395 (2000).
244. See, e.g., Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 955 (1999) (discussing how political favors
via environmental laws may be used to raise the costs of competitors).
245. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4), 3 C.F.R. at 644–48.
246. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
247. See Lee, supra note 185, at 679 (noting that interest groups have incentives to produce
information relevant to the political process that individuals do not have).
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interest groups provide.248 Because the regulatory review order should
help assure that the federal government provides public interest
goods rather than special interest goods, the disclosure requirement
for outside contacts was a salutary revision to President Reagan’s
regulatory review order.
In contrast, the requirements for internal executive branch dis-
closure introduced by the Clinton order should be deleted.249 These
requirements do not constrain special interests by bringing their ac-
tivity to the light of day. Instead, they curtail the candor of executive
branch deliberations, raising the president’s monitoring costs. They
may perversely strengthen the hands of special interests because spe-
cial interests have the resources to mount publicity campaigns that
will quote documents out of context and spin the initial deliberations
to make OIRA look bad.250 In attempting to avoid this danger, OIRA
may pull its punches and reduce the searching nature of its analysis of
agency regulations.
Two frequently voiced objections to permitting secret delibera-
tions among OIRA and the agencies seem less powerful once the
regulatory review process is seen as a substitute for the original Con-
stitution.251 First, it has been objected that such deliberations under-
mine review on the record because the judiciary may be unable to de-
termine the real reasons that underlie an agency’s decision to enact a
particular regulation.252 One response is that the agencies still will
have to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act: regardless of
their communications with OIRA, their record must support the
regulation in order to survive arbitrary and capricious review by the
248. Cf. Richard Nagareda, Note, Ex Parte Contacts and Institutional Roles: Lessons from
the OMB Experience, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 622 (1988) (arguing that interest groups will have
no reason to feel embarrassed to provide information about the compliance costs of regula-
tions).
249. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(5), 3 C.F.R. at 648.
250. See J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 623 (1982) (discussing the coherent and
coordinated campaigns that special interest groups can mount in the media).
251. For general criticism of the miscommunication that exists within the executive over-
sight process, see Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the
Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 185–89 (Autumn 1991).
252. See Steven T. Kargman, OMB Intervention in Agency Rulemaking: The Case for
Broadened Record Review, 95 YALE L.J. 1789, 1797 (1986) (acknowledging that an agency may
attempt to justify its actions by public record, which may disguise the true intentions behind the
decision).
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judiciary.253 But under the conceptualization of the regulatory review
process proposed in this Essay, judicial review has proved a poor sub-
stitute for constitutional restraints. By filtering regulations in the
public interest from special interest regulations, the regulatory review
process accomplishes the ends of the original Constitution. Insofar as
the disclosure of executive branch deliberations would detract from
this filtering, it undermines the essential role of the regulatory review
process.
Second, it also is objected that secret deliberations between
OMB and the agencies detract from public participation because
there is no opportunity to respond in the notice and comment pro-
cess.254 But the concept of regulatory review offered in this Essay sug-
gests that regulatory review counteracts the special interest domina-
tion of the notice and comment process. While the notice and com-
ment process is styled as public participation, few members of the
diffuse public actually contribute to that process relative to special in-
terest participation. In contrast to the notice and comment mecha-
nism, the agents of OIRA better represent the president who, in turn,
was elected by the public at large.
CONCLUSION
I do not claim that even revised executive orders can wholly
compensate for the decline of the original Constitution. Indeed, it is
my view that other institutions, like the World Trade Organization
and the Supreme Court, must play important compensatory roles in
restraining excessive and special interest government regulation in
the modern world.255 Moreover, these executive orders address only
the regulatory side of the modern administrative state and do not
seek to dissolve the welfare state that also has transformed the polity
that the Framers bequeathed to us. In recognizing the distinction be-
tween matters of allocation (to be addressed by regulation) and mat-
ters of distribution (to be addressed by legislative transfers), the ex-
ecutive orders simply reflect the economic consensus that regulation
253. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (permitting undocketed
executive branch communications with agencies but requiring that regulations have support in
the record).
254. Kargman, supra note 252, at 1797–98.
255. See generally McGinnis, supra note 142 (discussing the manner in which the Supreme
Court is trying to revive the decentralized structure of social norms); McGinnis & Movsesian,
supra note 16 (discussing how the World Trade Organization facilitates economic growth and
jurisdictional competition).
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is an inefficient way of addressing distribution compared with the tax
system.256
The federalism and regulatory review executive orders, even re-
vised according to these suggestions, will not and should not end the
debate about the proper scope of government regulation. As Profes-
sor Elena Kagan shows, President Clinton deployed the regulatory
review process for some regulatory projects that advanced the liberal
agenda.257 But this use is not surprising. Even within the confines of
the original Constitution’s charter for limited federal regulation,
Democrats and Whigs battled over the appropriate role for the fed-
eral government, in part because they estimated the costs and bene-
fits of state intervention differently.258
But, unlike some other commentators, I do not see the presiden-
tial review process simply as a technocratic one designed to create
better coordination within the executive branch259 or to advance the
undoubted virtue of government accountability.260 Instead, the feder-
alism and regulatory review orders replace New Deal norms con-
cerning the appropriate government structure with norms that are
closer to those of the Framers and that more effectively restrain the
special interests that seek to live off the modern administrative state.
There are broader lessons from this analysis of the regulatory re-
view and federalism executive orders. If these orders essentially com-
pensate for the decline of certain aspects of the original Constitution,
it shows that our constitutional norms can reassert themselves other
than through the judicial or amendment process. One of the advan-
tages of a system of separated powers is that, even if some branches
fail to honor the constitutional norms that lead to the production of
public goods, other actors may have an interest in reformulating these
norms. I have argued that the president is most likely to protect the
256. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 241, at 667.
257. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 65, at 2282–84 (demonstrating how President Clinton ad-
vanced regulatory projects, namely, limiting tobacco advertisements and controlling uses of un-
employment insurance, in accordance with the liberal agenda).
258. See G. Edward White, Revisiting James Bradley Thayer, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 48, 57
(1993) (suggesting that Democrats opposed the strong national government favored by Whigs in
part because they thought the costs imposed by special interests at the national level would be
very high).
259. See COMM’N ON LAW AND THE ECON., FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM
72–73 (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 1979) (justifying coordination within the executive branch).
260. See Sunstein, supra note 237, at 460 (discussing the advantages of the executive order in
promoting political accountability).
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structures that are aimed at screening out special interest regulations
because he benefits most from economic growth.
Moreover, the analysis offered here also suggests that there are
routes to the restoration of legal norms that do not simply revive the
original Constitution. If we are to restore the Framers’ principles of
government in a world that they could not have imagined and in
which their governmental framework has been distorted substantially,
it may not be possible or effective to revive the exact replica of the
Framers’ design. Thus, new ways must be sought to reconstitute a
limited interlocking structure of state and federal government that ef-
ficiently produces necessary public goods. The federalism and regula-
tory review executive orders can be an important part of this process
of reconstituting the polity and reclaiming the system of government
from the special interests that have been empowered by constitu-
tional decline in the twentieth century.
